B K JOY Vs. TOM JOSE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The substantial prayer in this O.P. is to declare R.16 of the Kerala Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal R.1977, as illegal, ultra vires and violative of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner has filed a claim petition as O.P.M.V. No. 22/83 before the 4th respondent. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam. The petitioner's son Joby Joy died as a result of an accident. The 2nd respondent is the driver of the vehicle, KLE 8303, at the time of the accident. The 1st respondent is the owner and the 3rd respondent is the insurer. The petitioner states that he has to prove negligence on the part of the tort feasors and for that he has to lead oral and documentary evidence. The petitioner examined one Anto on 13-11-1986. The case has been adjourned for further evidence. The deposition of Anto was not read out. It is unknown whether the Tribunal has recorded the entire deposition. It is stated that the Tribunal announced that it is not bound to record the evidence of the witnesses and get them signed by them. The award of the Tribunal is appealable R.145 and 146 of the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice enjoin the manner in which the deposition should be recorded and read over to the witnesses, etc. R.16 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal R.1977, in so far as it provides the recording of evidence as in summary trials, is violative of the principles of natural justice. It gives the Tribunals wide and unfettered power. The said R.16 of the Kerala M.A.C.T. Rules, 1977 deserves to be struck down. The petitioner prays for a declaration that R.16 of the Kerala M.A.C.T. Rules is illegal, ultra vires and violative of the principles of natural justice and for other reliefs.

(2.) I heard Mr. P. Ramanujam, counsel for the petitioner. It was argued that R.16 of Kerala M.A.C.T. Rules 1977, in so far as it provides only for making a brief memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness and such memorandum need only be written and signed by the members of the Tribunal, is arbitrary, unfair and violates the principles of natural justice. There is no substance in this argument. As held by a Division Bench this Court in Beeran v. Rajappan ( 1980 KLT 210 ) the Claims Tribunal is not a Civil Court. It is not bound by the strict rules of the Evidence Act. The following observations by Venkatarama Aiyar J. in Union of India v. T. R. Varma ( AIR 1957 SC 882 ) at p. 885 (paragraph 10) are apposite in this connection:

(3.) The word 'natural justice' is not capable of static or precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the strait-jacket of a cast iron formula. All that it means, is fairness in action. No definite and fixed definition of this term has ever been given. The principles will vary with varying situations of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function. The application of the principles will depend upon the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the authority and the nature and character of the rights of the persons affected, the scheme and the policy of the statute and other attendant circumstances. It is a very flexible principle which can be adjusted and adapted according to the exigency of the situation. The following observations of Lawton LJ. in Maxwell v. Department of Trade and Industry (1974) 2 All. ER 122) at page 131 precisely highlights what those words mean: