NALLUSWAMY Vs. VEEMBAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) JUDGMENT-debtor is the revision petitioner. In execution of the decree the attachable portion of his salary was under attachment for a continuous period of 24 months. Thereafter the decree holder initiated garnishee proceedings by attachment of the arrears of salary and bonus due from the employer to the judgment-debtor and the garnishee deposited rs. 1,552/ -. Overruling the objection of the judgment-debtor the amount was ordered to be attached. Revision is against that order.

(2.) THE first contention was under the proviso to s. 60 (1) (i) of the CPC. It was argued that since the attachment in execution of the same decree continued for a total period of 24 months it has the effect of discharge or satisfaction of the decree and no further steps in execution could be had. I do not think that the proviso has such an effect. That proviso merely inhibits the oppressive and tormenting process of subjecting the same judgment-debtor to the process of the law at the instance of identical decree holders without a respite if the attachment of salary continued for a period of 24 months whether continuously or intermittently. If the attachment of salary for a total period of 24 months continued in execution of the same decree, then it is not a question of respite, but a total exemption from attachment in execution of that decree. But that proviso is not having the effect of operating as an automatic discharge or satisfaction of the decree simply by reason of the attachment having been made for 24 months in execution of the same decree. If further amounts are due under the decree the decree-holder will definitely be entitled to have it realised by other available methods of execution provided there is no other bar. A different interpretation will have the disastrous effect which the legislature might never have intended. THEre may be cases in which the decree debt is a huge amount and what is realised by attachment of salary for 24 months is only a small fraction of it. If such an attachment is having the effect of the decree being fully satisfied or discharged it may be an injustice to the decree-holder. That must never have been the legislative intent. What is intended is only as a relief to the salaried class of judgment debtors to enable them to maintain themselves and their families in a suitable manner free from the harassment's of oppressive attachments in execution. THE proviso is not aimed at taking away the rights of decree-holders to realise the entire amounts they could realise by other available methods of execution of the decree.

(3.) BUT there is much force in the contention that what is prohibited under the proviso to S. 60 (1) proviso. (i) cannot be achieved by other indirect methods. Under that proviso when a portion of salary is under attachment to the permissible extent in execution of the same decree for a period of 24 months there is a complete exoneration from further attachment in execution of that decree. Explanation. 2 to S. 60 (1) says that for the purposes of clause. (i) and (ia) of the proviso salary means the total monthly emoluments, excluding any allowance declared exempt from attachment, derived by a person from his employment whether on duty or on leave. The effect of the exemption is that no execution can be levied in respect of such salary thereafter. Explanation.) to S. 60 (1) proviso says that exemptions from attachment are available whether before or after the amounts are payable. That means exemption is available even when salary fell into arrears and became payable to the employee. Even at that stage it will not cease to have the character of salary exempt from attachment. If exempted payments can be reached in execution by the appointment of a receiver by way of equitable execution or by garnishee proceedings as in this case, the protection afforded by the Section is to a great extent lost. It will be an improper use of that remedy to employ it to avoid the very definite bar created by the statute. The provision is by way of public policy and any method direct or indirect to overcome it cannot be allowed. In this connection I am in agreement with the view expressed in Kashi prasad v. A. A. D'cruz (AIR 1958 Calcutta 19 ). In this case what is sought to be realised by the garnishee proceedings is exactly what is prohibited under the proviso to S. 60 (1) proviso (i ). For that reason the objection had to be allowed leaving the decree-holder to resort to other possible methods of execution, if any. Amounts exempted from attachment will not cease to be so simply because it fell into arrears and remained with the employer to be paid to the employee on a later date. The revision petition is therefore allowed and the impugned order of the execution court is set aside. That means the amounts in the hands of the employer and payable to the judgment debtor cannot be proceeded against and it has to be returned for disbursement to the judgment debtor. No costs. . .