SHYLAJA MANOHARLAL Vs. STATE OF KERALA & ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN the year 1963 the Government of Kerala issued a notification, in exercise of powers under Sec.25 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959 exempting buildings owned by the City Corporation of Calicut from all the provisions of the Act. The 1959 Act has since expired, and has been replaced by Act 2/65, but the aforesaid notification is still in force. And the main question in this writ petition is whether the notification is valid. It is the petitioner's contention that the notification is unconstitutional and void, and that the provisions of this 1965 Act should continue to apply to the, arrangement under which she was allowed to occupy the 3rdt floor of the "Jayanthi Buildings " belonging to the Corporation. The petitioner was inducted into the building in 1975. There is some controversy as to whether the arrangement was a lease or a licence, but that question is being separately examined in other proceedings, and it is common ground that the sums need not be examined herein. Upto 31 -3 -1979 the agreed monthly rent was Rs.3750/ -. For renewal of the arrangement from 1 -4 -1979, the Corporation wanted the rate of rent to be enhanced to Rs 4125/ -per mensem, and it appears that the petitioner had no objection to such enhancement She continued to occupy the premises and carry on the business of running a lodging house in the name and style of "ManoharRest Horse", till 31 -3 -81. 'With effect from 1 -4 -81 the Corporation wanted the rent to be further enhanced to Rs.5775/ -, and it is this demand which has led to the filing of the present writ petition (and other litigations between the parties).

(2.) THE contention advanced in the present proceedings is this. The object of Rent Control legislation is to regulate letting of buildings, prevent rock -renting, impose severe restrictions on the landlord's power to evict building tenants. Sec. 25 of Act 2/65 empowers the State Government to exempt any building or class of buildings from the provisions of the Act "m the public interest and for any other sufficient cause". Sec. 25 of the 1959 Act under which he notification impugned was issued also contained identical provisions. However, "Public interest" and "sufficient cause" have to be understood as grounds or reasons germane to the policy and purpose of the Act: that is, there should be some rational connection between the exemption granted and the three objects referred to earlier. To give a blanket exemption to buildings belonging to Municipal Corporations will be to permit the Corporation authorities to defeat all the three objects of rent control legislation, at there sweet will and pleasure With the backing of the notification, the Corporation authorities can let out their buildings to whomsoever they like, demand unconscionable rates of rent from time to time, and drive out their tenants as and when it pleases. The conferment of such an arbitrary power by means of an exemption is itself bad. A Municipal Corporation is a public statutory authority and it should not be allowed to function like every other greedy -land lord. There is also no reason why local bodies like Corporations, Municipalities and Panchayats should be placed in a more favourable position than private citizens in the matter of letting out their buildings, particularly when putting up buildings and letting them out are not their functions under the statute which govern their activities.

(3.) I am unable to agree with such a Generalisation. Two questions had arisen in Irani's cases: (l) whether Sec. 3 of the Madras buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 was bad for conferring an unguided and arbitrary power on the State Government to discrimination between one building and another, in the matter of granting exemption from the Act and (ii) whether the exemption notified in that case, which was confined to one particular building, was valid. Sec. 13 of the Act was couched in very wide term -.: it empowered the state Government to exempt any building or class or buildings without even remotely indicating what considerations were to prevail in exercising power thereunder. The Supreme Court held, after surveying the provision of the Act, that Sec. 13 was valid, even though it was possible to subject individual notifications made under the section, to judicial review. As regards the individual notification before their Lordships Government had put forward certain reasons why the particular building war exempted and after examining these reasons, the majority of the court held that they were "not germane to the purpose for which the power was conferred". The enquiry by the court was into the question as to whether there was nexus between the grant of exemption and the purpose for which the legislature had conferred such power on the Government. It was not into the question whether there was nexus between the grand and the policy of the Act. It is not uncommon for an Act of the legislature to lay down a general policy and then make a provision conferring power on the executive to grant exemption, or permit deviations there from under certain circumstances. It will be a contradiction in terms to suggest that even such a deviation should be geared to the policy of the Act itself.