AYYAPPAN Vs. NARAYANAN NAMBOODIRI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) While ordering resumption of land from a tenant, the Land Tribunal is bound to direct the applicant to make payments to extinguish the rights of the cultivating tenant and the intermediaries, if any, who would be affected by such resumption. Under S.22(2), the direction should be to make the payment within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed. Prescribed means prescribed under the rules. Prescribed period under R.11(2) of the Tenancy Rules is 30 days from the date of the order. The jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal under S.22(2) is therefore to direct in the resumption order to make the payment within a time which could only be within 30 days. When once the time is so fixed sub-s.(3) authorises the Court to extend the time for sufficient reasons. What is provided under R.130 of the Tenancy Rules is only a general provision just like S.148 of the Civil Procedure Code authorising the authorities under the Land Reforms Act to extend the period fixed or granted by them for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Rules. Such general power is available even after the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. The question is whether that power under the general provision in R.130 to extend time even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired is available under S.20(3). The answer must be a definite 'no' because of S.20(8) which says that when the landlord fails to deposit the amount in accordance with the directions of the Land Tribunal, the order of resumption shall not only be treated as cancelled, but the landlord shall have no further right for resumption also.

(2.) In this case, the time fixed in the resumption order dated 30-6-1978 for payment was exactly the statutory period of 30 days provided in R.11(2). The deposit was not made within that period and no extension of time was asked for or granted on or before the expiry of that date. Just like S.148 of the Civil Procedure Code. R.130 of the Tenancy Rules also does not authorise extension of time fixed by the Act or Rules after the expiry of the period. Extension of time even after the expiry of the original period contemplated in R.130 is only regarding time fixed by the Land Tribunal. Such powers are necessary for Courts or Tribunals in doing justice or to implement orders in given cases. That is only a general provision which must be subject and subservient to the special provisions contained in the Act. Even otherwise the Rules must be in conformity with the provisions of the Act and cannot be in derogation of it or in conflict with it. Any rule which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act cannot prevail over the Act in spite of its statutory force and to the extent of the inconsistency or repugnancy it must be invalid. Rules are made under the provisions of the Act for carrying out its objects and purposes by implementation and hence must be within the four walls of the statutory provisions. Further a general provision intended to meet general contingencies must always yield to special provisions made to meet particular contingencies. The power to extend time under S.20(3) could have operation only subject to S.20(8) and the general provision contained in R.130 cannot enlarge the scope of the power under S.20(3).

(3.) S.20(8) provides for the consequences of default in depositing the amount in accordance with the direction of the Land Tribunal. On failure to deposit the consequences take effect automatically by operation of law without any further order. By legal fiction the order for resumption is then treated as automatically cancelled resulting in the further penal consequence of the landlord being disabled to have any further right of resumption. By operation of law the order thus becomes non est and completely erased as if no such order was passed. The effect is to confer an indefeasible benefit to the tenant by giving him the vested right of immunity from further resumption and impose a permanent disability on the landlord making further resumption by him impossible. That means vested rights and permanent disabilities are automatically created by a legal fiction as a penalty for the inaction. The right conferred under sub-s.(3) for extension of time will have to be compromised with this provision. Both provisions must have co-existence if possible. That must be the object of interpretation. The period provided under an order which has become non est and thus impossible of execution cannot be extended. Extension pre-supposes the existence of an order which is executable if time for execution is extended. When the order itself has become non existent, extension of time is out of question. Sub-s.(3) cannot be interpreted in such a way as to nullify the mandatory effect of sub-s.(8). If the statutory period was allowed to run out resulting in the non existence of an executable order, there is no occasion to exercise the jurisdiction under sub-s.(3). The only possible interpretation is that the power under sub-s.(3) must be sought for and exercised before the period prescribed under R.11(2). When once that is not done and the deposit is not made and the consequences under sub-s.(8) take effect there is no question of exercising the power under sub-s.(3). The order becomes dead and a dead order cannot be brought to life. Extension of life could be given only during its life time. I am fortified in these positions by the decisions in Kunhi Pathu v. Ayshu ( 1972 KLT 1014 ) and Theyyunni Nair v. Muhammed ( 1977 KLN 113 Case Notes Case No. 95).