C C TRANSPORTS CO Vs. STATE OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appeal is by one of the private operators against the decision of a learned Judge dismissing bis writ petition challenging the order approving a nationalisation scheme under S.68D of the Motor Vehicles Act. Ext. P-3 dated 1-8-1972 is the notification under S.68C of the Act; Ext. P-4 is the objection preferred by the appellant to the notification. That stated that the requirements of S.68C for formulation of the draft scheme, were not satisfied or present, and that there is nothing to show that an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport service could be provided by the proposed scheme A hearing of the objections was afforded by the Chief Minister on 22-6-1976. Ext. P3 preliminary scheme under S.68C of the Motor Vehicles Act was finally published on 27-10-1976. The scheme was approved under S.68D(2) and Ext. P5 is a copy of the approved scheme. Thereafter, action was taken under S.68F(2) of the Act. Ext. P-6 series represent the action so taken. The writ petition was to quash these proceedings relating to the nationalisation scheme.

(2.) The contention urged before the learned Judge was that the bearing and determination of the objections involved in the approval of the nationalisation scheme was a quasi judicial process which required a quasi judicial approach and that the said principle had not been borne in mind and no quasi judicial decision which recorded reasons in a speaking order bad been passed by the Chief Minister. The argument was repelled by the learned Judge. Before us again, arguments were addressed in regard to the nature and scope of the statutory provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the process involved in the approval of a nationalisation scheme, from the stage of the publication of the notification under S.68C to the stage of approval under S.68D. We were also taken through a series of decisions, from, perhaps the earliest, in G. Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation ( AIR 1959 SC 308 ). A cleavage of judicial opinion is reflected in regard to the nature of the functions involved in modifying and approving a scheme of nationalisation under the provisions of the Act, the majority of judges holding that the process involved was quasi judicial, and the dissenting judges being of the view that the process was essentially administrative and not quasi judicial. The view of the majority judges was followed in H C. Narayanappa v. State of Mysore ( AIR 1960 SC 1073 ) (Paragraph 14), Malik Ram v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1961 SC 1575 ) and C. S. Bowise v. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1964 SC 962 at 976). Counsel for the appellant contended that the uniform trend of these decisions was broken by two decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, C. M. P Co op. Society v. M. P. State ( AIR 1967 SC 1815 para 8), and Sarjoo Prasad v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1977 SC 24 at 26 Para.8). Arguments addressed to us ranged over a wide ground, which, it seems unnecessary to cover. The question agitated was whether, and it so; how far, a speaking order was a necessary element in the determination of objections to the scheme of nationalisation Counsel for the respondent invited our attention to Sen Datt v. Union of India ( AIR 1969 SC 414 para 10), for the proposition that there is no general or universal rule that every quasi judicial order must be accompanied by a speaking order; and again, a decision in M S.R.T. Corporation v. B.R.M. Service ( AIR 1969 SC 329 ) to the same effect. He further read to us the decision in Mohammed Ibrahim v. S.T A. Tribunal, Madras ( AIR 1970 SC 1542 Para.7 and 8) for the position that the provision for appeal is not decisive or conclusive of the quasi judicial nature of the function involved. Our attention was called to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in C K John v. State of Kerala & Others (1970 KLR 603) that there was no need to communicate the order individually to the various objectors who had raised objections in the course of the proceedings in question. (The Kerala Law Reporter shows the decision to be of a learned Judge, but it was, in fact, of a Division Bench).

(3.) It was really an interesting exercise to wade through the thread of these decisions and to cull out the ratio from the intricate maze of precedent. We feel, despite the great research and able exposition of counsel, that there would be no justification in this case for getting enmeshed in the niceties of this branch of the law. It was pointed out. for instance, by counsel for the appellant that the decision in Sen Datt v. Union of India (AIR 1969 SC 414) cannot be understood as having sanctioned the principle that a reasoned order is not necessary; because, in that case, the reasoned order of the court martial was affirmed by the confirming authority. It was pointed out that the affirmation carried with it an approval of the reasons given by the court martial. Even so, counsel for the appellant has put forward certain intelligible ground for distinguishing the decisions cited by counsel for the respondents