(1.) The appeal is by the State against the judgment of a learned Judge of this Court allowing a writ petition and quashing the two impugned orders, Exts. P3 and P4 The writ petitioner was a Police Constable who was directed to be removed from service for two charges framed against him. Broadly stated, the two charges were, disobedience to instructions issued by the superior authorities; and second, absence without permission for a period of 14 hours. These were enquired into and found to have been established; and by Ext. P3 order, the writ petitioner was directed to be removed from service. An appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police was dismissed by Ext. P4 order. The learned Judge quashed Exts. P3 and P4 on the ground that the misconduct was white the petitioner was on deputation under the Central Service and therefore the Commandant of the Malabar Special Police who took the action against the petitioner was not competent to do so, in respect of charge No. 1. In the light of this conclusion the learned Judge proceeded to state that if for charge (1) the purposed action could not be sustained against the petitioner, charge No. (2) had also necessarily to fail.
(2.) We cannot subscribe either to the reasoning or the conclusion of the learned Judge. R.18(b) of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958, has been relied on to show that the petitioner was on deputation at the relevant time and therefore the Commandant of the Malabar Special Police had no jurisdiction over him. The said Rule reads:
(3.) Quite apart from, and independently of, charge (1), and whether the Commandant had jurisdiction to enquire into and enter a finding on charge (1), we are of the opinion that charge No. 2 is, by itself, sufficient to sustain the action. Under Art.226, the learned Judge was not justified in quashing the impugned orders, merely on the ground that charge No. (1) was beyond the jurisdiction of the Commandant. The decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Sidyabhyshan ( AIR 1963 SC 779 ) is sufficient authority for the proposition that where two or more charges have been found against a person, and one or more of them is/are, found to be unsustainable, the resultant punishment can well be sustained, if the remaining charge is of sufficient gravity and seriousness to justify the punishment inflicted. We are of the opinion that the said principle applies to the case on hand, and that even if charge (1) is found to be without jurisdiction, charge No. 2 is sufficient to sustain the action taken and the punishment awarded.