ULAHANNAN CHACKO Vs. PAREED MARAKKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE three revision petitions were adjourned by our learned brother viswanatha lyer, J. to be heard by a Division Bench. It was submitted before the learned Judge that the Full Bench decision of this Court in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma (1973 Ker LT 138): (AIR 1974 Ker 162) required reconsideration in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U. P. (AIR 1976 SC 2161 ). The learned Judge felt that the question involved was fairly important.

(2.) THE respondent in an application for eviction before the Rent Control Court under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, filed an appeal against the decree to the appellate authority under the Act. Owing to the uncertainty in the identity of the forum where the appeal had to be presented, it flitted between the Sub Court, Parur, and the District Court, Ernakulam, till it was eventually decided by this Court in O. P. Nos. 353, 363, and 364 of 1971 that the proper court for presentation of the appeal was the Sub Court, Ernakulam, and that in view of the delay that had intervened, the appeal had to be presented to that court with a petition, to excuse the delay, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This was done. Meanwhile, a Full Bench of this Court in jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kumhi Umma (1973 Ker LT 1385 : (AIR 1974 Ker 162) had decided that the Limitation Act had application only to Courts. Fallowing the principle of the said decision, it was ruled by the Sub Court that there was no power to excuse delay in filing the appeal. The application to condone the delay was dismissed; and consequently the appeal was also dismissed. A revision was preferred to the District Court. That Court held that although the Limitation Act and the provisions of Section 5 thereof cannot apply in view of the Full Bench decision in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma (1973 Ker LT 138): (AIR 1074 Ker 162), the principle of Section 14 of the limitation Act would apply and the time spent in bona fide prosecuting the litigation, during the period when the appeals flitted between the Sub Court and the District Court, was liable to be excluded. The applications to excuse delay were accordingly allowed, and the appeals were directed to be taken on file. The Revision Petitions are before us against the said order.

(3.) IN the Full Bench judgment in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma, (1973 Ker LT 138) : (AIR 1974 Ker 162), speaking for the majority (Viswanatha lyer, J. dissenting), it was observed that the Limitation Act applied only to courts and prescribed periods of limitations in respect of suits, appeals and applications filed only in Courts. For the said proposition, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, (AIR 1969 SC 1335) which ruled that the limitation Act would apply only to proceedings governed by the Code of Civil procedure and only in respect of proceedings taken in Courts. The principle that the Limitation Act would govern only applications made to Courts was restated in Nityanand M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (AIR 1970 SC 209 ). Following these two decisions, the Full Bench had laid down the principle that the Limitation Act would apply only to proceedings under the Code) of Civil procedure taken in Courts.