BHAVANI AMMA Vs. MADHAVAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The short question that arises for decision in this writ appeal is whether the Revenue Divisional Officer, while disposing of an appeal preferred before him under sub-s.(4) of S.29 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (hereinafter called the Act) against an order passed by the Tahsildar preparing the record of rights in respect of a land, has the power to remand the case to the Tahsildar for fresh disposal The learned single Judge was of opinion that in view of the specific provisions contained in sub-s.(6) of S.29 and sub-r.(3) of R.28 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules, a power of remand is not vested in the Appellate Authority, namely the Revenue Divisional Officer, and accordingly the learned Judge allowed the writ petition, out of which this writ appeal arises, and quashed the order Ext. P2 dated 26 12 1974 passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Chengannur remanding the case to the Tahsildar for fresh disposal after examination of certain additional witnesses. The 1st respondent in the writ petition is the appellant before us and it is contended by her that the aforesaid view taken by the learned single Judge is not correct

(2.) Sub-s.(1) of S.29 of the Act provides that any person interested in any land may at any time within 10 years from the commencement of the Act or such further period as the Government may by notification in the Gazette specify in that behalf, apply to the Tahsildar of the taluk in which any land is situated for the preparation of a record of rights in respect of that land. Sub-s.(2) states that on receipt of an application under sub-s.(1) the Tahsildar snail prepare the record of rights in respect of the concerned land in such manner as may be prescribed. What the record of rights should contain is enumerated in sub-s.(3). Thereafter it is provided by sub-s.(4) that any person aggrieved by any entry in the record of rights prepared by the Tahsildar under sub-s.(2) may, within such period as may be prescribed, appeal to the Revenue Divisional Officer having jurisdiction over the area in which the land is situate. It is stated in sub-s.(5) that the appeal aforementioned shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed. Then we come to sub-s.(6), which being of special relevance requires to be extracted in full:

(3.) It is no doubt well established that when an appellate power is conferred on an authority or tribunal without any particularisation of the scope or ambit of such power or the mode in which it shall be exercised, it may be impliedly taken as carrying with it the incidental power to remand the matter to the original authority if the circumstances of the case so require see Dharmadas v. S. T. A. Tribunal ( 1962 KLT 505 (FB)). But this principle will have no application to cases where the statute conferring the appellate power either itself exhaustively sketches the impact of the power or the mode of its exercise or delegates that function to the rule making authority to be prescribed by the rules and provision is contained in the rules laying down the mode of the exercise and the scope of the appellate power or the mode of disposal of the appeal to be adopted by the appellate authority. In such cases the powers of the appellate authority will have to be gathered from the four corners of the provisions contained in the statute or the relevant rules and there is no scope for any assumption by implication that the appellate authority has an inherent power of remand vested in it see Joseph v. District Judge ( 1963 KLT 64 ). Coming to the statute before us it is clearly indicated in sub-s.(6) of S.29 that the appellate authority should dispose of the appeal only in such manner as may be prescribed. As noticed already, the only modes of disposal of an appeal by the appellate authority permitted by R.28(3) are either by an order dismissing the appeal or by an order directing the Tahsildar to make such additions, alterations, deletions etc. as are in the opinion of the Revenue Divisional Officer necessary in the record of rights. It is therefore clear that the statute and the rules did not intend to vest in the appellate authority a power of remand of the case to the Tahsildar. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned single Judge that the Revenue Divisional Officer acted without jurisdiction in remanding the whole case to the Tahsildar for fresh disposal after examination of certain additional witnesses.