EACHARA VARIER Vs. HOME SECRETARY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) And now we come to the end of the tragic tale.

(2.) Horror houses and torture chambers have figured in films and fiction. We would have assumed they had no contemporary relevance, but the gruesome story unfolded to us in this, the last chapter of this case, speaks of brutal and inhuman torture in a Police camp in the State organised by Senior State Police Officials. The Home Secretary to the Government and the Inspector General of Police of the State have now, in marked contrast to their earlier stand, affirmed before us, in no uncertain terms and with expression of regret, that Rajan, who was directed to be produced in court was in fact taken into police custody as found by us in this case. But Rajan, we are told, is no longer available for production. He is said to have succumbed to "operation torture". Rajan having thus escaped from a world of sadistic Policemen, never to return, as we are told, now, these proceedings must come to an end, for, in Habeas Corpus the role of the Court is only to compel the production of the living.

(3.) Despite the stand of the respondents on the earlier occasion we were satisfied that Rajan had been taken into custody by the police from the College hostel. We were convinced that the plea to the contrary was dishonest. We presumed that he was still in custody in the absence of evidence to explain what happened to him after he was taken by the police. Hence we issued the writ to produce Rajan. The normal consequence of non compliance therewith would be punishment for contempt. Since our direction was based on an assumption which we were compelled to make in the unique circumstances of the case we gave an opportunity to the respondents to show cause for non compliance. The cause now shown by the respondents 1, 2 and 4 is the demise on 2nd March 1976 of the boy Rajan directed to be produced before this Court. This information is said to be base I on materials gathered by specially appointed investigating officers. After having heard counsel and perused the material made available to us by the learned Advocate General we accept, for the purpose of these proceedings, the case stated before us by the Advocate General that Rajan is dead and hence cannot be produced. If production of Rajan is not possible by reason of the fact that he is not alive there would be no question of proceedings for disobedience of the order of this Court; whatever may be the circumstances resulting in the death, and whatever be the responsibility of any or all of the respondents direct or indirect, mediate or immediate, legal or moral for permitting a situation leading to such an event to develop. Hence we have to close the contempt proceedings. We do so.