YOHANNAN Vs. THOMAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question of law that falls for decision in this revision is whether the period of thirty days specified under sub-r.(2) of R.11 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules, 1970, hereinafter called the Rules, is to be reckoned from the date of the original order passed by the Land Tribunal, or from the date of the order of the High Court passed on revision under S.103 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964, as amended by Act 35 of 1969, for short the Act.

(2.) The facts are not in dispute. The petitioner was allowed to resume a portion of the holding held by respondents 1 and 3 under him, on an application filed by him under S.17 and 22 of the Act (as it stood before being amended by Act 35 of 1969, the amendment, however, having no bearing to the dispute). The order of the Tribunal dated 30 6 1971 provided, inter alia:

(3.) Sri. N. Venkatarama Iyer, the counsel for the revision petitioner, submitted that on a harmonious and reasonable construction of he provisions contained in sub-s.(2) of S.22 of the Act and sub-r.(2) of R.11 of the Rules, the period of two months allowed for deposit of the amount of compensation awarded is to be deemed to reckon from 18-9-1974 on which date, on dismissal of the revision, the order of the Tribunal became final, not from 30-6-1971 on which date the original order of the Tribunal was passed. The counsel also added that in fairness it has to be conceded that only thirty days from the date of the order could have been initially allowed by the Land Tribunal in terms of the relevant provisions; however, that is of little consequence, for the deposit made by the revision petitioner was on 15-10-1974, before the expiry of thirty days from the date of the dismissal of the revision by the High Court, and when the time was to be reckoned from the date of the order of the High Court, it was in time. The further contention of the counsel is that the observation contained in Para.9 of the decision in Kunhipathu v. Ayshu (1972 KLT 1014), relied on by the Tribunal and the Appellate Authority, is obiter in nature, as that was a case in which the petitioner did rut deposit the amount within thirty days from the date of the disposal of the appeal, and that fact alone was sufficient to hold that there was no deposit within the stipulated period