SANKARA NARAYANAN Vs. SEETHARAMAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY S. 35 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Act 17 of 1972) sub-section (8) was introduced into S. 125 of the Kerala land Reforms Act, 1963. That sub-section is to the effect that in S. 125 "civil court" shall include a Rent Control Court as defined in the kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. Under S. 2 (5) of the kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, " Rent Control Court " means a court constituted under S. 3 of that Act. S. 3 of that Act enables the Government to appoint a person who is or is qualified to be appointed, a Munsiff to be the rent Control Court for such local area as may be specified therein, by issuing notification in the Gazettes in that behalf. The result of the aforesaid amendment in S. 125 of the Land Reforms Act, 1963 is that from and after the introduction of sub-section (8) therein the words "civil court" has to be understood as including a Rent Control Court . The question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is as to whether the Munsiff who was constituted the Rent Control Court, the 2nd respondent herein, is correct in holding that a Rent Control Petition instituted in 1971 in bis Court is not liable to be stayed under S 125 (3) of the Land Reforms Act, 1963, for the reason that the said Rent Control Petition was filed previous to the introduction of sub-section (8) in S. 125 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. Ext. P2 is the copy of that order whereby the 2nd respondent Munsiff as aforesaid held that the Rent Control petition instituted in 1971 is not liable to be stayed for the reason that it was instituted in 1971 before the enactment, Act 17 of 1972, came into force.

(2.) S . 125 (3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, hereinafter referred to as the Act, reads: "if in any suit or other proceeding any question regarding rights of a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran (including a question as to whether a person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran) arises, the civil court shall stay the suit or other proceeding and refer such question to the Land tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the land or part thereof is situate together with relevant records for the decision of that question only. " From and after Act 17 of 1972 came into force, but for any other provision and on a plain reading sub-section (3) extracted above, the rent Control Court will have to stay any proceeding before that Court if in such proceeding any question regarding the rights of a kudikidappukaran arises, and will have to refer that question to the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the land or part thereof; i. e. , 'the kudikidappu' as defined in S. 2 (25) of the Act, is situate. It is contended on behalf of the landlord that in so far as sub-s. (8) came into force only in 1972 the provision in sub-s. (3) shall not be attracted to Rent Control Petitions instituted prior to 1972. On a literal reading of sub-section (3) of S. 125 of the Act it is not possible to accede to the aforesaid contention. That sub-section means that if in any suit or other proceeding, irrespective of when it was instituted, any question regarding the rights of a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran-including the question as to whether a person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaranarises, the civil court (which as per sub-section (8) would from and after 1972 include a Rent Control Court also) shall stay the suit or other proceeding and refer the said question to the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the land or part thereof is situate. The time with reference to which the bar imposed by sub-section (3) arises and the "civil court" is obliged to make the reference is, going by the grammatical meaning of sub-section (3), not the time of the institution of the suit or proceeding, but the time when the question referred to in that sub-section arises. So understood and as earlier pointed out without reference to any other provision in S. 125, whenever any question arises before a Rent control Court after 1972 when sub-section (8) was introduced into S. 125, under sub-section (3) the proceedings will have to be stayed by the Rent Court Court and the question referred to the concerned Land Tribunal.

(3.) OVERRULING the Full Bench decision of this Court in ananthanarayana Iyer v. Paran (1976 KLT. 405 the Supreme Court construing s. 125 (1) and 125 (3) of the Act said in Eapen Chacko v. Provident Investment Co (1977 KLT. 1) as follows: "matters which will be within the mischief of S 125 (1) of the Act are matters which will arise in suits or proceedings initiated and originated after the commencement of the Act. It is unsound to suggest that pending proceedings which are excepted from the application of s. 125 [1] of the Act will yet fall within S 125 [1] of the Act by reference to s. 125 [3] of the Act. " Earlier the Supreme Court said in the aforesaid decision as follows. "s. 125 [1] of the Act created a bar against civil court to settle, decide or deal with the questions required to be settled by the Land Board in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The provisions contained in S. 125 [1] of the Act are prospective. S. 125 came into effect on 1st January 1970, when the other amendments introduced by the 1969 amendment Act came into force. The proviso to S. 125 [1] of the Act expressly states that s. 125 [1] of the Act shall not apply to proceedings pending in any court at the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1969 on 1st January 1970. The effect of the proviso is to carve out by way of exception what would otherwise have fallen within the provision to which it is a proviso. "