MURALEEKRISHNA DAS Vs. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) One Sri Muraleekrishna Das, Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, now under suspension, has filed this petition against the Inspector General of Police of the State of Kerala praying that this court may take proceedings for perjury against him under S.340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The charge of perjury is levelled against the Inspector General of Police in connection with some statements made by him in the counter affidavits filed in O. P. No. 1141 of 1977, a petition for Habeas Corpus filed by one Sri Eachara Warrier complaining that his son Rajan arrested from the Regional Engineering College, Calicut on 1st March 1976 was detained by police and this court may direct production of Rajan in court. Though the respondents to the petition denied that Rajan bad been arrested or had been taken into the custody of the police, this court found that he had been taken by the officers of the police to an investigation camp set up at Kakkayam. As Inspector General of Police of the State the second respondent had been impleaded and writ was issued against him too Later respondents 1, 2 and 4 in that case filed affidavits admitting that Rajan had been taken into custody by the police and while he was detained in the camp he died as a result of torture inflicted on him. The State caused further investigation to be made as a consequence of which a case has been charged against certain police officers of the State for the offence of murder. Respondents 3 and 5 in O. P. 1141 of 1977 are among the accused in the case. The petitioner herein who was not a party to the Original Petition is also said to be an accused in that murder charge. On a motion made by Sri Eachara Warrier this court had occasion to examine whether the respondents in the Habeas Corpus Petition including the Inspector General had committed the offence punishable under S.193 of the Indian Penal Code by giving false evidence to this court in their affidavits concerning the fact of taking Rajan into custody. While respondents 1 and 2, the Home Secretary and Inspector General of Police were exonerated, respondents 3 to 5 have been found to be liable to be proceeded against for perjury under S.340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Though the Inspector General of Police has thus been exonerated by this court by the order passed earlier on 13th June 1977, according to the petitioner that ought not to have been done since there was a case for taking up proceedings against him for perjury. Though no additional data or material which would justify a fresh look into the question of action against the Inspector General of Police has been furnished in the petition certain averments are made as to the existence of such material and it is said that if the court causes further investigation to be made in the matter it is possible for the court to come across such material as would indicate that in making statements to this Court the respondent has not been speaking the truth.

(2.) At the outset a preliminary objection has been raised as to the maintainability of this petition. The matter having been considered by this Court once and a decision having been rendered on the merits whether fresh proceedings could be taken up is a question of some importance. The further question concerns the locus standi of the petitioner. He is not a party to the earlier proceedings and if he comes to this Court merely as a busy body possibly the Court may not take serious notice of his action. Though not so stated in the petition, at the hearing Sri P. V. Ayyappan, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted to Court that despite the fact that insistence on prosecution for perjury against the respondent may to some extent be suicidal to his client, his attitude was that the Captain must sink with the crew'.

(3.) We were concerned in the earlier proceedings only with examining the question whether respondent had committed perjury in stating to this Court that Rajan had not been taken into police custody. Since this Court in the evidence available found that he was so taken and it was disclosed by respondents 1, 2 and 4 that Rajan had been taken into police custody, the only question to be considered was whether respondents were aware of that fact when they said to the contrary in their counter affidavits. In fact respondents need not even be aware. If they were not certain that Rajan was riot taken into police custody they should have only said so. If they were in doubt as to whether Rajan had been taken into custody they should have said so and they could not have said that Rajan was not taken into custody. If they were not sure or certain about . it they could not have believed that their statement that Rajan was not taken into custody was true and they should not have asserted a fact which they did not believe to be true. It is an offence not only to state something which is false but also to state something which is not believed to be true. On the materials before us we did not feel that there was sufficient reason to find that the Inspector General of Police was speaking to a fact which he knew was false. For reaching this conclusion we relied on the fact that his source of information was the report no doubt unsatisfactory of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Crimes, who was in charge of the investigation who was dealing directly with the Government and not through him and that there was no case that Eachara Warrier ever met the Inspector General of Police. In other words there was no indication in the case that there was any occasion for the Inspector General of Police to be appraised of the complaint otherwise than through the correspondence and papers that passed through him. We also indicated that suspicion cannot be a substitute for some material on which alone this Court could direct prosecution. While we saw reason to comment on the conduct of the Inspector General and his efficiency we found that there was no case to bold on the available material that the second respondent was guilty of giving false evidence.