SREEDHARAN Vs. MOHAMMED KUNHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) RESPONDENT who is the landlord applied for evicting the Petitioner -tenant under Section 11(2)(b) of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (which we will call the Act for short) on the ground that he was in arrears of rent. On February 26, 1974 the Petitioner deposited in the Rent Control Court the rent till the end of that month for payment to the Respondent. However on February 28, 1974 the Rent Control Court passed an order of eviction on the ground that the amount deposited was insufficient as it did not cover the costs of the proceedings, adding a rider within Section 11(2)(c) that the Petitioner could get the order vacated by making up the deficit amount within one month. The Petitioner did not do this within the time but made an application I.A. 192 (A)/74 for vacating the order only on June 1, 1974, supporting it with an affidavit explaining the circumstances which led to the delay. He also deposited Rs. 37.10 being the costs and the rent up to date. The Rent Control Court dismissed the application in the view that it had no power to condone the delay and allow the application, as it was made only after the period of one month had expired. This conclusion has been confirmed by the Appellate Authority and Revisional Court on substantially the same reasoning, dismissing the appeal and revision taken by the Petitioner challenging the order of the Rent Control Court.

(2.) THE revision filed by the Petitioner has come before us pursuant to a reference made by a learned single Judge for deciding whether "...in view of Sections 11(2)(b) and (c) and 23(1)(i) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, the Rent Control Court, which is a persona designata has all the powers of a civil court under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act for the purpose of 'enlargement of time originally fixed or granted'. (See Section 23(1)(i) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act." Section 11(2)(b) lays down the circumstances under which the Rent Control Court can pass an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession on the ground of arrears of rent. The proviso that follows prescribes the conditions precedent to an application by the landlord for eviction. Clause (c) and Section 23(1)(i) on whose interpretation the revision falls to be decided deserve to be quoted in full:

(3.) THAT the Rent Control Court under the Act is a persona designata and not a civil court is clear and has been settled by the Full Bench decision Vareed v. Mary, 1968 K.L.T. 583 delivered by one of us (Eradi, J.). The question before us is whether it has the power under Section 11(2)(c) and Section 23(1)(i) of the Act to enlarge the time originally fixed or granted in terms of Section 11(2)(c) by the order dated February 28, 1974, on an application made after expiry of that time. Although Section 5 of the Limitation Act had been invoked by the Petitioner before the Rent Control Court and it is mentioned in the order of reference, that section in our view has no relevance, for the period of one month granted by the Rent Control Court is no period of limitation and the substance of the Petitioner's prayer was to allow in its discretion further period within Section 11(c) or enlarge the period within Section 23(1)(i), till he made the deposit and not to condone any delay. Further no period is prescribed for an application of the type made by the Petitioner before the Rent Control Court. And yet again Section 5, Limitation Act, applies only to courts and not to authorities like the Rent Control Court or the appellate authority. We might refer to Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma, 1973 K.L.T. 138 (F.B.) holding that Section 5, Limitation Act has no application to the appellate authority and to Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad : A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 177 holding that a Collector to whom an application is made under Section 3 of the Kosi Area (Restoration of Lands to Raiyats) Act, even though he is vested with certain specified powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, is not a court within Section 5 of the Limitation Act. An earlier decision Nityanand v. L.I.C. of India : A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 209 had ruled, in a case arising under the Industrial Disputes Act, that the "scheme of the Indian Limitation Act is that it only deals with applications to courts and that the Labour Court is not a court within the Indian Limitation Act 1963". This decision and a prior decision Athani Municipality v. Labour Court, Hubli : A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1335 were followed in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma supra to hold that the Limitation Act applies only to court and that consequently Section 5 had no application to appellate authority under the Act, as it is not a court but only a persona designata., 1973 K.L.T. 138 has itself been followed in S. Ganapathi v. N. Kumaraswami : A.I.R. 1975 Mad 383 for the same purpose. Section 5 of the Limitation Act therefore creates no problem.