MANNINKAL KRISHNA KURUP Vs. SWAMIYAR AVERGAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant plaintiff was a clerk in a religious institution governed by the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. The hereditary trustee of this institution had been removed from office and the management of the institution taken over by the Endowments Board which acted through an executive officer, and it would appear that the plaintiff was first appointed as clerk by the executive officer. However, consequent to the provisions of the Act authorising such assumption of management having been struck down, the management was restored to the trustee, the 1st defendant herein who appointed the 2nd defendant as a manager under him. On application made by him to the 2nd defendant on 1-7-1956, the plaintiff was appointed as a clerk on probation, and, that being so, it is clear that the plaintiff's right to the office of clerk depends solely on his appointment under the 1st defendant and cannot in any way relate to his previous appointment by the executive officer,

(2.) Notwithstanding that S.49 of the Act affords the servants of religious institutions some measure of protection in the matter of punishment, there can be no doubt that the plaintiff's right to the office derives from a contract for personal service. The Courts below were therefore quite right in declining to order his reinstatement, and his prayer for reinstatement with back wages was hi effect a prayer not merely for reinstatement but for arrears of salary without paying court fee therefor and without regard to the question of limitation. But I do not think that the courts should have refused the plaintiff the declaration he sought in so far as it relates to the order of dismissal. It has not been contended that S.49 of the Act is bad, and that being so, it follows that the order of dismissal made against the plaintiff having been set aside by an authority duly empowered by the statute to do so. that order is no longer in force. I think that the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration to that effect.

(3.) So far as the order of suspension is concerned that, it would appear, has not been set aside by the Deputy Commissioner in appeal.