STATE OF KERALA Vs. P M JOSEPH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By the award, Ext. P-1 duly made under Section 15, and duly published on 303- 1954, under Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), and which by reason of Section 17-A read with Section 18 (3) became binding on him thirty days thereafter, the accused in this case was directed to pay three separate sums of money as compensation to three of his discharged employees within one month from the date of publication. The accused did not, and to this day has not, made the payments; but he filed an appeal under 3. 12 of, the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, (XLVIII of 1950), and, on 30-8-1955, the appellate tribunal made an order setting aside the award in favour of one of the employees and confirming the awards in favour of the remaining two. Meanwhile, on complaint made by the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Trivandrum, under the authority of the State Government granted under Section 34 of Act XIV of 1947, the accused was tried by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Trivandrum, for an offence under Section 29 of the Act, for breach of the award, Ext. P-l, and, on 31-8-1956, he was convicted under that section and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 75/, (The learned magistrate also imposed a default sentence of two months' simple imprisonment which we observe exceeds the limit set by Section 65 of the Indian Penal Code, the maximum term of imprisonment for the offence being six months). The accused appealed, and in appeal the learned Sessions Judge acquitted him taking the view that the original order having been modi-fed by the appellate tribunal, the effect of Section 16 of Act XLVIII of 1950, was to substitute the decision of the appellate tribunal for that of the original tribunal with retrospective effect so that the position was as if original award were never made. Therefore the breach committed by the accused must be deemed to be a breach of the decision of the appellate tribunal and not of Ext. P-1. In other words, the learned Judge took the view that the conviction was for the breach of an award which, by reason of the modification by the appellate tribunal, must be deemed to have never existed. Against this acquittal the State has appealed.

(2.) We do not agree with the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge. In the first place it is to be observed that the original award was not a joint award in favour of the three employees but was really three separate awards made by a common order. The cancellation of the award in favour of one of the employees did not in any manner affect the awards in favour of the remaining two which were confirmed. These latter awards were not modified, and so there can be no question of applying Section 16 of Act, XLVIII of 1950, to them. Secondly, we do not read Section 16 of Act XLVIII, as having the effect which the learned Sessions Judge has given to it. That section runs as follows :

(3.) Many other contentions were taken be-fore the learned Sessions Judge. They were repelled by him and they are not pressed before us.