LAWS(KER)-1957-10-36

K J ANTONY Vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Decided On October 21, 1957
K.J.ANTONY Appellant
V/S
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner Shri. K. J. Antony was employed for some time as a clerk in the Joint Stock Companies department of the Travancore - Cochin State. He was appointed to that post on the basis of the selection and advice made by the State Public Service Commission. He was relieved from service on 5-2-1955 on the ground that the vacancy in which he was acting as clerk had terminated. His complaint that the 2nd Respondent who was at that time the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies department, was acting mala fide in relieving him and at the same time allowing one Shry. Vijayamma who was recruited as clerk more than a year after the recruitment of the petitioner, to continue in service. His representations to have that mistake rectified and to get himself reinstated in service did not find favour with the authorities concerned and thereupon he has filed O. P. No. 20 of 1955 invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Art.226 of the Constitution for the issue of appropriate writs cancelling his wrongful termination of service and directing his reinstatement. In the meanwhile, the petitioner filed another application before the Public Service Commission to get his name re-registered for further appointment in the service of the State. Along with that application he produced the relieving certificate issued to him by the 2nd Respondent. Copy of that relieving certificate has been produced in this court and marked as Ext. A. The Public Service Commission is represented in this O. P. by the Secretary of the Commission who is the first Respondent. The Public Service Commission refused to entertain the petitioners application for reregistration. The Commission went one step further and passed an order purporting to debar the petitioner from service for a period of 2 years with effect from 19-4-1955. Copy of the memo dated 23-5-1955 to that effect issued to the petitioner has been produced by him and it has been marked as Ext. B. The memo is in these terms:

(2.) In the counter affidavits filed by both the Respondents, they have denied the allegations made against the validity of the orders embodied in Exts. B and C and of the remarks contained in Ext. A. They have sought to maintain that these orders and remarks are all legal and proper and have been passed in exercise of the lawful authority possessed by them.

(3.) The order embodied in Ext. B is on the face of it an order of punishment passed against the petitioner. It has not been possible for the Public Service Commission to show that the Commission has got the power and the jurisdiction under any statute or Standing Order to inflict such a punishment on candidates applying to the Commission for selection to the public service. That the Commission has no such power and jurisdiction is practically conceded in Para.10 of the counter affidavit filed by the 1st Respondent. Therein it is stated that the words debarred from service for two years in the order Ext. B were intended to mean only that the re-entry of the petitioners name as a candidate for recruitment has been refused for the specified period of two years. That such was the intention of the Commission in passing the impugned order, cannot be gathered from the order. The order speaks for itself and the words used in it can only be understood in their plain and natural meaning. As the order stands, it is undoubtedly an order of punishment. Since the Public Service Commission has not been empowered to pass such an order, the complaint of the petitioner that the order is ultra vires of the powers of the Commission has to be accepted as real and well founded. It is also seen that such an order was passed without previous notice to the petitioner to enable him to vindicate his position and to show that there was no justification for condemning him in the manner done by the passing of the impugned order. Clearly, therefore, the Commission had violated the rules of natural justice in passing such an order behind the back of the petitioner. In this view of the matter, the contention advanced on behalf of the Commission that the order Ext. B is valid and proper and in accordance with law, equity and justice has only to be repelled. As already stated, it is not shown that the order was passed under any legal authority. The order is also unsupportable on grounds of equity and justice. These reasons in themselves are sufficient to justify interference with those orders and the cancellation of the order embodied in Ext. B and also the subsequent order Ext. C by which the petitioners request for a reconsideration of the first order was summarily turned down.