G V RAMANAN Vs. GOVERNMENT PLEADER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner has been convicted by the Second Class magistrate of Cochin in Calendar Case No. 619 of 1954 by his judgment dated 22. 12. 1955. THE concluding portion of the judgment reads as follows: "in the result I convict the accused under S. 45 (1)of Act IX of 1125 read with S. 41 (3) of the said Act and sentence him to pay a fine of Rupees Twenty-five or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two weeks".

(2.) ACT IX of 1125 is the Travancore-Cochin Shops and establishments ACT, 1125. Sub-s. (1) of S. 45 of that ACT provides that any employer who contravenes any of the provisions of the sections enumerated in that sub-section "shall be punishable, for a first offence, with fine which may extend to twenty-five rupees and for a second and subsequent offence, with fine which may extend to two hundred and fifty rupees". S. 41 is one of the sections mentioned in S. 45 (1) and it reads as follows: " (1) No employer shall dispense with the services of a person employed continuously for a period of not less than six months, except for a reasonable cause and without giving such person at least one month's notice or wages in lieu of such notice, provided, however that such notice shall not be necessary where the services of such persons are dispensed with on a charge of misconduct supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an inquiry held for the purpose. (2) The person employed shall have a right to appeal to such authority and within such time as may be prescribed either on the ground that there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services or on the ground that he had not been guilty of misconduct as held by the employer, (3) The decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the employer and the person employed".

(3.) THE Second Class Magistrate also seems to have been labouring under a misapprehension as to the scope of a trial for the contravention of the provisions of S. 41 in view of sub-s. (3) of that section which says that "the decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the employer and the person employed". Para. 13 of his judgment reads as follows: "s. 41 (3) is explicitly worded and states that'the decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the employer and the person employed'. In the face of this, I do not think that this court is competent to question Ext. A (the decision of the appellate authority under S. 41 (2) dated 21. 11. 1952) or to find that it has been passed without jurisdiction. I therefore reject this argument".