DAVID CHACKO, S/O. CHAKKOCHAN Vs. PIRAVOM MUNICIPALITY, PIRAVOM P.O, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN.686 664, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) As all these writ petitions involve a common issue, they are taken up together for consideration and disposed by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience, the reference to facts and exhibits is from W.P.(C).No.551 of 2017.

(2.) The petitioners in all these writ petitions are persons, who were running brick manufacturing units within the limits of the Piravom Municipality. It is not in dispute that they had obtained the necessary licenses for running the brick manufacturing units and that the said licenses were valid till 31.03.2016. Prior to the expiry of the licenses for the year 2015-2016, the petitioners preferred applications seeking renewal of their licenses for the ensuing year namely, 2016-2017. The said applications preferred by the petitioners were rejected by a common order dated 01.04.2016 (produced as Ext.P12 in W.P.(C).No.551 of 2007), stating that the Municipal Council had already taken a decision not to renew the licenses of the brick manufacturing units. The said order also directed the petitioners not to continue with the activity of brick manufacturing in their respective premises. The petitioners were also asked to submit their objections in the matter within 15 days from the date of receipt of the order. It might immediately be noticed that, if Ext.P12 order was to operate as a final order, then there was no requirement for the respondent Municipality to have indicated in the said order that the petitioners could approach the Municipality within 15 days from the date of receipt of the order with their objections, if any, to the contents of the said order. Coupled with the fact that the Municipal Council decision, that is referred to in Ext.P12 order, was one that was taken without any intimation to the petitioners and without hearing them prior to the said decision, the latter portion of Ext.P12 order, which required the petitioners to submit their objections, if any, to the contents of Ext.P12 order, can only be seen as one that was intended to grant a post decisional hearing to the petitioners, in respect of the decision of the Municipal Council not to renew the license of the petitioners for conducting the brick manufacturing units. The facts in the writ petition would indicate that, immediately on receipt of Ext.P12 order, the petitioners preferred their objections before the respondent Municipality. In W.P(C).No.551 of 2017 and W.P(C).No.595 of 2017, the replies preferred by the petitioners therein clearly refer to the common order dated 01.04.2016 that was passed by the Municipality, and seek a renewal of the license that was earlier issued to the petitioners therein. In the other writ petitions, the replies submitted by the petitioners therein to the common order dated 01.04.2016 indicate that a request was made therein for the issuance of No Objection Certificates (NOC) by the respondent Municipality, that would have enabled the petitioners therein to continue with their brick manufacturing activities. While the reference in the latter replies is to an NOC, viewed in the statutory scheme of things, this can only be taken as a request for renewal of the licenses that had already been issued to the petitioners in the earlier year. At any rate, by separate orders dated 25.08.2016 and 27.07.2016 respectively, the respondent Municipality rejected the request of the petitioners for renewal of license/issuance of NOC. Immediately on receipt of the said orders from the respondent Municipality, the petitioners approached the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions through appeals preferred in terms of the Municipalities Act and Rules. The said appeals were heard together, and by a common order dated 20.12.2016 (produced as Ext.P17 in W.P(C).No.551 of 2017), the Tribunal dismissed the appeals preferred by the petitioners herein as belated. In all these writ petitions, the common order of the Tribunal referred above is impugned, inter alia, on the contention that the Tribunal ought not to have seen the appeals preferred by the petitioners as belated since they were bona fide pursuing the matter before the respondent Municipality in the belief that the order dated 01.4.2016 was only a provisional one that would be finalised only after considering their objections.

(3.) I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in all these writ petitions, the learned Standing counsel for the respondent Municipality and the learned counsel for the additional contesting respondents in W.P.(C).No.631 of 2017 and W.P.(C).No.606 of 2017.