(1.) The doctrine of part performance, which began as a principle of equity developed in England, subsequently found its way into the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 through the Amendment Act of 1929. This doctrine is embodied in Section 53A of the Act that provides a defence for one who has acted upon an agreement with another for transfer of immovable property, thereby creating an equity for himself which cannot be resisted by the transferor on grounds of technicalities and absence of formalities. It gives protection to the transferees, by allowing them to retain possession over the property, against rights of transferors, who after execution of incomplete instrument of transfer refuses to complete it in the manner specified in law without there being any fault on the part of the transferee.
(2.) In this case, the appellant, who is alleged to be the transferee under an agreement of sale, alleges that he is in possession under the said agreement and he seeks remedies under Section 53A against dispossession. The operational nuances of the provisions of Section 53A and that of the doctrine of part performance are called into attention in this case and what is most relevant for our consideration, in the backdrop of the facts pleaded and established, is whether the appellant can be said to be in possession of the property on the strength of the alleged agreement of sale that he claims was executed by the owner of the property. Auxiliary issues relating to the nature of possession and the validity of a claim under Section 53A when the transferee has admittedly given up such possession to other persons on arrangement of tenancy and the like have also been placed for our inspection and evaluation in this case.
(3.) Before we record our answer to the various issues we will state the most essential facts.