P K ALAVI Vs. DISTRICT COLLECTOR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These cases were referred to the Division Bench mainly to consider the question regarding the power of the District Collector to confiscate the vehicle involved in illicit transportation of river sand under the provisions of the Kerala Protection of River Banks and Regulation of Removal of Sand Act, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). It is the contention of the petitioners that there is no valid provision conferring jurisdiction on the District Collector to confiscate the vehicle involved in such illicit transportation of river sand and proceedings of confiscation and condition releasing of the same are all invalid. Already with regard to the mining and transportation of sand, there are ample laws like the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 and Rules made thereunder. However, in view of the environmental problems created by indiscriminate mining of sand, in addition to the above, this Act was also brought into force by the Legislature. The objects and preambles of the Act read as follows:

(2.) There is apparent difference in the wordings in Malayalam and English versions. Even if the word is 'confiscation' as in Malayalam, statutory rules will show that Police Officers or Revenue Officials other than the Collector cannot release the vehicle or sell the vehicle and confiscation of the vehicle cannot be exercised by officers other than Collector. If it is only a power of seizure as in English version, nothing is state in the Act what one has to do with the seized vehicle and the provisions became purposeless. This shows that the section was drafted in a hurry. Section 23 in Malayalam text passed by the Legislature and English translation need further interpretation. When the words of a statute are clear, plain and unambiguous and capable of one meaning only, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences as held by the Apex Court in Nelson Motis v. Union of India, 1992 2 LLJ 744 . See also Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, 2002 Supp2 SCR 324 and Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, 2005 AIR(SC) 648. The rule stated by Tindal, C.J. in Sussex peerage case (1844) 11 CI & F85, p. 143 is in the following form: "If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver". As held by the Apex Court in Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests, 1990 2 SCR 401 , p. 1752 and Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India, 2002 2 SCR 369 the intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. Literal or strict interpretation is accepted by the Apex Court in Promoters & Builders Assn. of Pune v. Pune Municipal Corporation and Ors., 2007 6 SCC 143 . As a consequence a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. This rule like all other rules is subject to exceptions. We have seen that words used in English and Malayalam versions are in conflict and one has to use external aids for interpreting and understanding the intention of the Legislature. As held in Holmes v. Bradfield Rural District Council, 1949 1 AllER 381, p.384 and Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, 1976 1 SCR 505 in selecting out of different interpretations "the court will adopt that which is just reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those things as it may be presumed that the Legislature should have used the word in that interpretation which least offends our sense of justice. As held in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, 1958 1 LLJ 500 the words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. When the material words are capable of bearing two or more constructions the most firmly established rule for construction of such words "of all statutes in general (be they panel or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law" is the rule laid down in Heydon's case (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a. p. 7b. This rule was accepted by the Apex Court in various cases. The rule is also known as 'purposive construction' or 'mischief rule'. The rule shows mat the courts must adopt that construction which "shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy". The rule was explained in the Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, 1955 2 SCR 603 by S.R. Das, C.J.I, as follows:

(3.) When a power is given to seize the vehicle involved in the offence, there should be purpose for the same. If the Police or revenue officials have got any power to seize the vehicle, there should be something to be done after seizure. If mere seizure of the vehicle is concerned and nothing further can be done, seizure became meaningless or purposeless. Apex Court in Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose,1953 SCR 215 held as follows: