LAWS(KER)-2007-10-94

A. C. ANWAR Vs. STATE OF KERALA

Decided On October 23, 2007
A. C. Anwar Appellant
V/S
STATE OF KERALA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In all these cases, after the disposal of the revisions, petitions have been filed by the accused seeking enlargement of time for payment of the compensation ordered to be paid under S.357(3) CrPC. It was then felt as to whether enlargement of time if granted in these applications would not amount to review of that part of the final orders passed in the revision thereby offending S.362 CrPC. The learned counsel for the applicants argued that it would not amount to review of that part of the final order and that even if it would amount to review, the power under S.482 CrPC was wide enough to overwrite S.362 CrPC. The arguments were mainly addressed by Adv. Sri. Sunny Mathew and Adv. Shri. A. X. Varghese.

(2.) Interpreting S.561A of the 1898 Code, a three Judges' Bench of the Supreme Court in Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar and Another, 1964 (2) SCR 336 : 1964 (1) CriLJ 1 : 1964 (2) MLJ (SC) 21 : AIR 1964 SC 1 observed that the High Court sitting in appeal in a suitable case could judicially correct the observations of the lower Court by recourse to its inherent power under S.561A CrPC but cautioned that the said power must be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interest of the party concerned would irrevocably suffer otherwise. In Raj Kapoor and Others v. State (Delhi Administration) and Others, 1980 (1) SCC 43 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 72 : 1980 MLJ (Cri) 439 : 1980 (17) ACC 110 : AIR 1980 SC 258 a two Judges' Bench of the Apex Court had to consider whether the inherent power of the High Court under S.482 CrPC would stand repelled, when the revisional power under S.397 overlapsed. It was observed that there would not be any bar in exercising the inherent power in view of the opening words of S.482 itself which says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The overriding words at the beginning of the Section were held to be wide enough to circumvent even the power of revision under S.397 of the Code. Again in Puran v. Rambilas and Another, 2001 KHC 640 : 2001 (2) KLT SN 102 : 2001 (2) KLJ NOC 18 : 2001 (2) KLJ NOC 28 : 2001 (6) SCC 338 a two Judges' Bench of the Supreme Court reiterated that the bar under S.397(3) does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court under S.482 CrPC. The position was further reinstated by two Judges of the Apex Court again in Mary Angel and Others v. State of T.N., 1999 KHC 519 : 1999 (2) KLT SN 76 : 1999 (5) SCC 209 to say that S.482 CrPC is not controlled or curtailed by any of the provisions of the very same Code. In Dinesh Dutt Joshi v. State of Rajasthan, 2001 KHC 1181 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 24 : 2001 (8) SCC 570, the question arose before a two Judges' Bench of the Apex Court as to whether the power under S.482 could be exercised to fill any procedural lacunae and it was held that the inherent power could be exercised even to cover any procedural lacuna in the statute. In State v. Navjot Sandhu, 2003 KHC 668 : 2003 (2) KLT SN 132 : JT 2003 (4) SC 605 : 2003 (6) SCC 641 which is the celebrated Parliament Attack case, the Apex Court in paragraph 29 of the judgment reiterated the position that the power under S.482 CrPC could be exercised notwithstanding the power under S.397 or any other provision of the CrPC though not against the power under other laws. In Mahendra Singh and Others v. State of Bihar, 2004 SCC (Cri) 1158 : AIR 2002 SC 387 : 2002 (10) SCC 678 , even though it was observed by a two Judges' Bench of the Apex Court that filing too many applications under S.482 CrPC, after the rejection of the 1st one seeking enlargement of time for deposit of the fine amount was not permissible, the Supreme Court granted one month's time for making deposit of fine as directed by the High Court. Of course, in the decisions reported in Mostt. Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee, 1990 KHC 543 : 1990 (2) KLT SN 32 : 1990 (2) SCC 437 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 327 : AIR 1990 SC 1605 : 1990 (2) Crimes 271 : 1990 CriLJ 1599 , Sankatha Singh and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1962 KHC 364 : 1962 (1) KLR 530 : 1962 Supp (2) SCR 817 : 1962 (2) CriLJ 288 : AIR 1962 SC 1208 and Moti Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1994 AIR SCW 1161 : AIR 1994 SC 1544 a different note is struck to hold that in the face of an express bar either in the form of S.362 or any other Section, the power under S.482 cannot be invoked by the High Court so as to review its own judgment or order, those decisions were not in the context of seeking enlargement of time fixed under the final order passed by the High Court in revision.

(3.) After a careful evaluation of the aforesaid rulings of the Apex Court, I do not think that it is impermissible for the High Court to grant enlargement of time fixed under the final order passed in a revision by resorting to S.482 CrPC in deserving cases. I am also convinced that by granting enlargement of time in these petitions filed under S.482 CrPC, this Court will not be offending S.362 CrPC. In this view of the matter, I proceed to examine the petitions filed in each of the cases on their own merits.