MINI SREEDHARAN NAIR Vs. VALSALAKUMARI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE common question involved in this batch of writ petitions relates to the power of this Court under Art.226 or 227 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the interlocutory orders passed by the Courts/Election Tribunals in deciding the election petitions arising out of the elections to the local bodies like Panchayat, Municipal Corporations etc. The elections to the Panchayats and Municipal Corporations are regulated by the provisions contained in Chap.10 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 and Chap.10 of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994, as the case may be. The election involved in O.P. No. 13650 of 1996 relates to the Municipal Corporation and the rest of the writ petitions relate to election to Panchayats.

(2.) AT the outset, it was argued on behalf of the contesting respondents that these writ petitions are not maintainable in view of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Bhargavan v. Majeed (1960 KLT 1262) inasmuch as the orders challenged are purely interlocutory orders passed by Election Tribunals in the main Election Petitions pending before them. In order to decide this question it is essential to examine the ambit and scope of the powers of this Court under Art.226 and 227, the nature of the interlocutory orders and the true scope of the principles laid down by the Division Bench in the aforesaid case.

(3.) THE Supreme Court after discussing the decisions in Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde (AIR 1978 SC 955), India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M. A. Baker (AIR 1978 SC 45), Mrs. Labhkuwar Bhagweni Shah v. Janardhan Mahadeo Kalan (AIR 1983 SC 538) and Chandayarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata (AIR 1987 SC 117) dealing with power of superintendence under Art.227 and Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale (AIR 1960 SC 137) a case under Art.226, held in Venkatlal G. Pittie v. M/s. Bright Bros (Pvt.) Ltd. (AIR 1987 SC 1939) thus: "But the High Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution to look into the facts the absence of clear cut down reasons where the question depends upon the appreciation of evidence. The High Court should not interfere with a finding within the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal or Court except where the finding is perverse in law in the sense that no reasonable person properly instructed in law could have come to such a finding or there is misdirection in law or view or fact has been taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence or the finding is not based on any material evidence or it resulted in manifest injustice. Except to the limited extend indicated above, the High Court has no jurisdiction." From the above it is seen that the Supreme Court has not drawn any difference between the width of exercise of power under Art.226 and Art.227. The principles laid down in Venkatlal G. Pittie's case (AIR 1987 SC 1939) supra would apply in so far as the exercise of power in both the cases. At the same time the jurisdiction under these two Articles is separate and independent. In this context it is apt to note that the judicial superintendence conferred by Art.227 is not limited by the technical rules which govern the power to issue writ of certiorari under Art.226. Thus the power under Art.226 would be available for exercise when there is an application by the aggrieved party. On the other hand the power under Art.227 may be exercised by the Court suo motu if there are circumstances warranting such action.