G. SUGUNAN Vs. STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner who has been nominated as member of the Board of Directors of the 3rd respondent Bank has filed the above O. P. to quash the order of the Registrar withdrawing and cancelling the initial order of nomination.

(2.) The facts in brief are that the petitioner is an advocate practising in Nedumangad. The election to the Board of Directors of Trivandrum District Co-operative Bank Limited, hereinafter referred to as the Bank, was held on 17-3-1996 and 10 candidates were declared elected as Directors of the Bank. Under Sec. 31 of the Co-operative Societies Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, nominees of the Government can be appointed on the. committee of an apex or a central society. By virtue of the said power the petitioner was nominated by the Registrar in his proceedings dated 20-3-1996. By a subsequent proceedings dated 26-3-1996 which is impugned herein the Registrar withdraw the proceedings of nomination and cancelled the same. In the said proceedings the Registrar has stated that as per the Model Code of Conduct once the general elections to the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies are declared it would not be in order for the Registrar to nominate members to the Co-operative Societies and as a remedial action the impugned order was issued.

(3.) The contentions on behalf of the petitioner are that the impugned order had been passed without notice and in violation of the principles of natural justice. The impugned order visits the petitioner with evil consequences affecting his rights adversely and depriving his nomination. According to him, Co-operative Society is not an authority under the Government but is an autonomous body governed by the provisions of the Act. No writ will be issued to it as it is not statutory. Government have no control over the functions of a Co-operative Society except to the limited extent provided under the Act. Government, therefore, have no power to issue a direction as has been done by its letter dated 25-3-1996 and it is without jurisdiction. In this context, learned counsel referred to the decision of the House of Lords in Secretary of State for Education and Science Vs. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council 1977 AC 1014. In the said decision the House of Lords have held that the Secretary of State is not entitled under Sec. 68 of the Education Act, 1944 to require the education authorities to abandon the policy because he disagreed with it. He could give a direction only if they were acting unreasonably. Learned counsel also referred to the decision in Rees Vs. Crane 1994 1 All ER 833. In that case the Privy Council has held that the Chief Justice had power to organise the procedures and sitting of the courts in such way as was reasonably necessary for the due administration of justice, including allocating a Judge to do particular work etc. The Chief Justice's decision that the respondent should not sit until further notice effectively barred him from exercising his functions as a Judge sitting in Court and went beyond a mere administrative arrangement. The decision is therefore ultra vires of the Chief Justice. The Privy Council also held that natural justice would require that the audi alteram partem rule be applied at the commission stage of the proceedings to suspend or dismiss a Judge. Learned counsel also submitted that the Model Code of Conduct refers to Government/Public Undertakings and does not apply to a Co-operative Society.