K BABU Vs. UNION OF INDIA UOI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner, a clerk/cashier of the Kottayam Branch of the Union Bank of India, was prosecuted for offences punishable under S.409, 467 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code, for alleged forgery of a cheque and unauthorised withdrawal of amounts from the account of one of the bank's constituents. The criminal court acquitted him on the ground "that the prosecution had failed to bring home the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt". Notwithstanding the acquittal the management of the Bank decided to proceed against the petitioner departmentally, by issuing Ext. P1 charge sheet and appointing an enquiry officer. The petitioner "objected to the holding of the enquiry" on various grounds, but the Bank management was not prepared to relent. This writ petition was thereupon filed in December, 1982 challenging the authority of the management to take disciplinary action against its employees in respect of acts of omission or commission of which they are already adjudged not guilty by the criminal court of the land. (The challenge to Ext. P3 was not pressed at the hearing).

(2.) It is common ground that in matters relating to "disciplinary action and procedure therefor", the first respondent bank and its employees are governed by the provisions of Chap.19 of the settlement dated 19-10-1966 entered into between the Indian Banks' Association and the Bombay Exchange Banks' Association on the one part, and their workmen represented by the All India Bank Employees' Association and the Ali India Bank Employee' Federation on the other. Clause.19(3) of the said settlement reads:-

(3.) It seems to me that there are many difficulties in granting the declaration that Clause.19(3) is void "in so far as it permits disciplinary proceedings on the same set of allegations which was subject matter of criminal trial, in which the employee was acquitted." The first is that the parties to the settlement, namely, the two Associations of employers and the two trade unions, are not parties to the writ petitions. The second is that a writ court, in the exercise of its discretion, will not readily accede to a request for unsettling a consensual arrangement in the area of industrial relations, which has apparently been working satisfactorily for about two decades. And the third is that the attack against the sub clause is not founded on any provisions of the Constitution or any statute or statutory rule, but only on some concept of issue estoppel, res judicata or similar doctrines on the applicability and relevance of which judicial opinion has not been uniform. And finally, so far as this Court is concerned, the question raised is also covered against the petitioner by a few decisions.