LAWS(KER)-1986-4-4

RAVINDRAN Vs. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR L A

Decided On April 03, 1986
RAVINDRAN Appellant
V/S
SPECIAL TAHSILDAR (L.A.) Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Cochin City Corporation wanted to open a new road, and steps were taken under the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 to acquire 0. 4625 hectares of land required for the purpose. Notification under S. 3 was published on 22-1-1974. THEre were about 68 persons interested in the land, and individual notices under R. 3 were served on most of them. THE petitioners are some of the persons concerned. (THEre is a controversy as to whether petitioners (1) to (3) were entitled to notice, but that is not material, in view of decisions on the scope of S. 3, and also in view of the circumstance that none of the petitioners had, at the relevant time, any objection to the proposed acquisition ). THE declaration under S. 6 was published in Gazette dated 20-1-1976, but thereafter, the proceedings appear to have gone into hibernation for quite a long time. Notices under S. 9 (3) were issued to the parties only in december, 1981. Ext. P5 and the averments in the Writ Petition disclose that the petitioners had then complained that it was improper to continue the acquisition proceedings after such long lapse of time; all the same, they put forward their claims regarding compensation payable. THE award enquiry was completed on 6-1-1982, but the passing of the award was held up, it is suggested on behalf of the respondents, because the present Original Petition came to be filed and admitted in the meanwhile.

(2.) THE original petition is directed against the acquisition proceedings. Many grounds are seen raised, but counsel did not press most of them, in my opinion, advisedly. THE only point pressed is based on the lapse of time between the initiation of the acquisition proceedings and issue of notice under S. 9. As already seen, the proposal was statutorily mooted under S. 3, in January, 1974. Though S. 6 declaration was made in January, 1976 notice under S. 9 (3) was issued only in December, 1981, and the enquiry itself was proposed to be held in January, 1982. During the eight years between 1974 and 1982, it is said, land value in the locality has been increasing day by day, as a result of inflation and other circumstances; but by reason of S. 11,15 and 25 of the Act the petitioners would be given market value of the land only at rates which were prevalent in January, 1974. THE long and unexplained delay deprives the petitioners of valuable rights and unduly enriches the State. On the authority of this Court's rulings in Moideen v. Special Tahsildar (1981 KLT 59) and George v. Spl. Tahsildar (1984 KLT 471), the petitioners contend that the acquisition proceedings have either to be quashed, or the authorities directed to award value for the lands in question at the current market rate.

(3.) THE two principles which form the basis of the decisions in Moideen (1981 KLT 59) and George (1984 KLT 471) are not strangers to the field of administrative law: they are but two sides of the same coin-a coin very much in circulation and called want of bona fides. Unreasonable exercise of power, and its exercise for a purpose not recognised by the statute both converge on the question of bona fides. It can also be said that no statute shall be permitted to be used as an instrument of fraud. Difficulty however arises when these principles are sought to be pressed into service as part of a mechanical formula grounded on "delay". For example, the argument of counsel in the case on hand is that as this Court had interfered when the delay was nine years in one case and five years in the other, I should also interfere, because the delay here is from 1974 to 1986, and still the proceedings are not complete. I am unable to make any such generalisation from the two cases noticed. On the other hand, I think this Court should caution itself against a trend, now fast developing, to bring every land acquisition case within the time limits of the above two cases, by getting stays on various grounds, and ultimately giving up all such grounds and pressing only the grievance based on time-lag, so as to claim "present market value". THE giving of a blank cheque creates a temptation to overdraw.