SUGATHAN Vs. DY SUPDT OF POLICE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application for police protection. Protection is sought on the ground of totally unjustified intervention on the part of the trade unions. The Unions, the fifth and sixth respondents, have appeared through counsel and have filed a counter affidavit.

(2.) Ordinarily in relation to cases where bona fide labour disputes exist, or even when strikes are going on, this Court will be very cautious in granting police protection in such a way as to stifle legitimate trade Union activities. Extraordinary situations would, however, call for extraordinary solutions; even in the matter of prayer for police protection.

(3.) The stand taken by the 5th and 6th respondent Unions and the document Ext. R6(a) produced by them, pose a serious matter for consideration by this Court and by the law and order agencies in the State. Ext. R6(a) evidences a transfer by two workmen of their rights of employment in favour of two other workers. The person in whose favour transfer is executed is the Secretary of the Trade Union. In essence, it would appear that the Secretary of a Trade Union is a dealer in workmen and that he can transfer the property in the workmen concerned. This arrangement is fundamentally opposed to a proper employer-employee relationship. As is well known, unlike in slavery, an employee under an employer has got the liberty to leave his employment. That indeed is the hall mark of the relationship of master and servant as distinguished from the slave and the slave owner. The relationship is one between the employer and the employee. Security of employment is secured by diverse pieces of legislation in the social, commercial and industrial field. Subject to such safeguards in favour of the employer, it is the employer who has got the right to decide as to how the establishment should he run; it is he to decide as to who should be employed. He cannot be ordinarily compelled by the employee or the trade union to employ a person chosen by the Trade Union. In the present case, as noted earlier, what is attempted is to arrogate to the Trade Union Secretary, the entire power of appointment, transferor termination of the workers. That is not permissible under our system of law. No provision had been brought to my notice which would justify the execution of an agreement of the nature of Ext. R6(a). The Secretary of a trade union is dealing in workers, like chattels as was the practice in days of old. The agreement puts the Union movement itself in a very bad light. In the closing ears of 20th century, such a practice cannot be tolerated by a court of law.