BIYYATA ATTABI Vs. MUTHUKOYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The second defendant in a suit filed before the Inspecting Officer's Court at Androth is the appellant. The property involved in the suit belonged to the tarwad of the plaintiff and the first defendant. On 3-3-1959, the first defendant executed a document of assignment in respect or the property in favour of the second defendant. The plaint averred that although the document was executed on 3-3-59, no steps were taken by the second defendant in assertion of his title and that the plaintiff happened to know about the document when the survey operations were in progress in the island during 1962. He instituted the suit on 3-3-1963 alleging that the first defendant had no authority to assign the property and praying for a decree setting aside the document. One of the contentions raised by the defendants was that the suit was barred by limitation. The plea was upheld by the Trial Court. An appeal was filed before the Administrator, which was transferred to the District Court. Calicut and thereafter to the Subordinate Judge at Kavaratti. The Subordinate Judge set aside the decree of the Trial Court and remanded the suit to the Munsiff's Court, Androth for fresh disposal in the light of the findings recorded. The order of remand is challenged in this appeal.

(2.) Whether the suit filed on 3-3-1963 was barred by limitation is the point to be considered. Reference may in this connection be made to S.21A which was added to the Laccidive Islands and Minicoy Regulation, I of 1912 (for short 'the Regulation') in the year 1926. The section reads:

(3.) The expression "cause of action" is not defined in the Regulation. It is generally understood as the bundle of material facts which give rise to an enforceable claim. In the limited sense, it refers to facts which constitute the infringement of a right. If it is understood in the strict sense the plaintiff in the instant case got a cause of action against the defendants as soon as the document was executed. It follows, the date of execution of the document is one of the dates when the Cause of action arose. But the plaintiff could have instituted the suit only if he had come to know about the execution of the document. Therefore, justice and fair play require that in deciding when the cause of action arose the date on which the plaintiff knew about the document or could have known about the document should also be taken into account. Reference may in this connection be made to S.21 of the Regulation of 1912 which reads: