SEKHARAN Vs. STATE OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner in this original petition is a person who entered into a contract with the 4th respondent - The Vaikom Service Cooperative Society Ltd., No. K. 349, Vaikom for the construction of a godown. As the petitioner did not complete the construction in time, the 4th respondent cancelled the contract and completed the construction through somebody else. Thereafter, for realising the damages suffered because of the petitioner's failure to complete the construction, the 4th respondent filed an arbitration before the 3rd respondent Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies (General), Vaikom under S.69 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act, 1969, for short the Act, and R.67 of the Rules framed thereunder as A.R.C. No. 254 of 1974. The petitioner contested the matter. He filed an application before the 3rd respondent to try the objection that the 3rd respondent has no jurisdiction as a preliminary issue. The 3rd respondent by Ext. P-1 order dated 18 9 1974 held that he has jurisdiction in the matter. The petitioner questions the above order of the 3rd respondent in this original petition. The 4th respondent has filed a counter affidavit. The questions that arise for consideration in this original petition are: (1) Whether the claim for damages against a contractor entrusted with the construction of a godown for a society, the objects of which include the maintenance and letting out of godowns for the storage of agricultural produce of its members will be a matter touching the business of the society and hence a dispute which can be referred to the Registrar for decision under S.69(1)(f) of the Act and (2) Whether such a claim will be a claim in respect of any sum payable to the society and hence a dispute as defined under S.2(i) of the Act.

(2.) Shri S. Parameswaran, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the matter in issue is not a dispute as contemplated by S.2(i) of the Act and hence the 3rd respondent has gone wrong in holding that he has got jurisdiction in the matter. Shri Parameswaran also contends that the matter in issue is not, at any rate, a dispute touching the business of the society and hence the 3rd respondent has no jurisdiction under S.69(1)(f) of the Act to entertain the application for arbitration. According to Shri Parameswaran, the 3rd respondent failed to note that an act might be for the purpose of the business of the Society, but still it will not be a matter touching its business. Shri Parameswaran points out that the deeming provisions in S.69(2) of the Act also will not confer the 3rd respondent with jurisdiction in the matter. Learned counsel then refers to Varghese v. Krishna Menon (1962 KLJ 43) wherein Raghavan J. (as he then was) has said:

(3.) Shri Sankarasubban, learned counsel for the 4th respondent refers to S.2(i) of the Act and contends that in view of the inclusive definition, the matter referred to the 3rd respondent for arbitration is a dispute which the 3rd respondent can entertain under S.69(1)(f) of the Act. Hence, according to the learned counsel, Ext. P-2 order of the 3rd respondent holding that he has got jurisdiction in the matter is perfectly legal and valid. Learned counsel also points out that the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not on statutes pari materia with the Kerala Act. Learned counsel then contends that in respect of money claims, even if it is not in respect of any matter touching the business of the society, it will be a dispute because of the definition in the Act. Learned counsel also refers to S.69(1)(f) of the Act and contends that the matter referred to the 3rd respondent will squarely fall under S.69(1)(f) of the Act. Learned counsel then refers to S.56 of the Travancore Cooperative Societies Act, 1112 and points out that the definition in the Kerala Act is wider than the definition in the above Travancore Act. Hence, according to the learned counsel, the decision Raman Achari v. Paramu Achari ( 1957 KLT 362 ) cannot apply to the facts of this case. Learned counsel refers to bye law No. 3 of Ext. P-3 bye laws of the Society and contends that for storage of agricultural produce purchased from the members the Society can construct godowns. So, according to the learned counsel, going by the objects of the society as revealed by the bye laws, the matter referred to for arbitration is one touching the business of the Society. Learned counsel further contends that the words 'touching the business of the society' have to be given a wide interpretation and they must include any matter which relates to or concerns the business of the society. According to the learned counsel, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the 4th respondent was not having business transactions with the petitioner. Reference is then made to Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad ( AIR 1970 SC 245 ) wherein construing the expression 'touching the business of the society' the Supreme Court said: