MATHAI Vs. LAND TRIBUNAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question referred to the Division Bench for its decision is whether under S.77 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969 (for short 'the Act'), a Land Tribunal can entertain application for shifting a Kudikidappu to a new site on the ground that the landholder bona fide requires the land for constructing a building for his married major son. In an analogous case, Balakrishna Eradi, J. held in Janaki v. Land Tribunal, Tellicherry and others ( 1973 KLT 923 ) that a married daughter of a landholder, a woman belonging to the Thiyya community governed by Marumakkathayam law was a member of her family and she could claim a shifting of a Kudikidaupu for providing a residence for that daughter. The correctness of the above decision was doubted by Bhaskaran, J. and that occasioned this reference.

(2.) The argument put forward by the petitioner who raised the objection is based on an interpretation of the words 'family' in S.2(14) and S.75(2) of the Act. S.2(14) defines a family in the following terms:

(3.) The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that since the definition of a family in S.2(14) excludes married minor children, the expression "any member of his family including major sons and daughters" in S.75(2) does not take in married major sons and daughters But the above reasoning omits to take into account the opening words of S.2. "In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires." Evidently, in the context of shifting of Kudikidappu for the occupation of the land-holder and members of his family, the Legislature has given the go by to the definition of the family in S.2(14). This is evident from the fact that not only the family but even major sons are included for the purpose of S.75(2). It says: "his family including major sons and daughters". The definition of the family in the Act has been deliberately departed from for the purpose of S.75(2). What is more significant is that S.75(2)(a) does not make any difference between major sons and daughters married or unmarried. There can be little scope for a court to alter the plain words of a section by giving restrict d meanings to the words used in the section, in the absence of indications in the statute that such different meanings should be given either because of express provision in the statute or necessary implications arising from the subject, context or contents of the statute read as a whole. We do not find any such indications in the Statute. We are, therefore, obliged to understand S.75(2) when it refers to major sons and daughters as comprehending both married and unmarried major sons and daughters.