KUMARA MANNADIAR Vs. DIST EDUCATIONAL OFFICER PALGHAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question raised in this appeal which the learned Judge in the judgment under appeal declined to consider as it was felt that the statutory remedies available were adequate turns on the interpretation to be placed on the proviso to S.12A of the Kerala Education Act, 1958, for short, the Act. We shall extract the section:

(2.) This section was inserted by the amending Act 31 of 1969. There is a purpose behind the section. The inactivity of a manager or bis lenient attitude in regard to a certain teacher or his inability to enforce discipline should not lead to deterioration of discipline in a school as it would be against public interest. So if the manager omitted to take necessary disciplinary action, the educational authorities themselves can rectify that omission. This can be done only subject to the terms of the proviso which we have extracted. The contention that is raised before us by the appellant, a manager cum teacher in a school who has been convicted of a criminal offence is that the educational officer has disregarded the proviso in the section and had not intimated the manager, that is himself, the need for disciplinary action and without doing so has passed the order Ext. P1 removing the appellant, from service. It was submitted by counsel that this action of the Educational Officer, the 1st respondent being against the statutory provisions and therefore according to counsel, without jurisdiction, this Court can interfere in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. Mr. M. K. Rawther, Government Pleader contended before us that we should read the proviso in a limited manner as being not applicable to cases where the manager who has to take action is also the teacher against whom action should be taken, for in such cases to ask the manager to take action against himself can in most cases end in an unsatisfactory manner. A human mind is normally biased or prejudiced in its own favour and to ask a man to punish himself after considering all the aspects would be a travesty of justice. He reminded us of the well known principle that a man shall not be a judge in his own cause. He invited our attention to a passage from the judgment of Cotton L. J. in Leeson v. General Council of Medical Education 43 Ch. D. 379 which reads as follows:

(3.) The other reason which compelled us to deal with the petition on the merits is the further contention raised by the petitioner that even assuming that the District Educational Officer has not acted disregarding the proviso to S.12A he has acted in a manner violative of the principles of natural justice in that no opportunity had been afforded to him for being heard. The pleadings in the case commenced by saying that there has been no such opportunity afforded. The only question then is whether in such circumstances it is not necessary to afford an opportunity. The rule under which actions have been taken which culminated in the order Ext. P1 is R.77A in Chap.14(A) of the Rules reading as under: