SUKUMARA MENON Vs. TANKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These two revision petitions are filed against a common judgment disposing of two appeals by the Appellate Authority, Land Reforms. The revision petitioner filed two applications for resumption of lands in the possession of a tenant holding land more than the ceiling area applicable to him. The petitioner is a member of the armed forces. He filed the applications for resumption within six months of the commencement of Act 35 of 1969 as provided for in S.18 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act Number of contentions were raised against these applications. The Land Tribunal found on all the points against the tenant and thereupon allowed the applications for resumption. Against this decision two appeals were filed by the tenant and the question whether the applications for resumption were barred by limitation was heard as a preliminary point. The Appellate Authority found that these applications were barred and hence without going into the other contentions raised in the appeal allowed the appeals and dismissed the applications for resumption. These revision petitions are filed against this decision of the Appellate Authority.

(2.) Application for resumption under any of the grounds referred to in S.14 to 17 should be filed within one year of the commencement of the Act. The above Sections came into force on 1-4-1964. So, unless the petitioner can come under the proviso to Sub-s.(1) of S.18 his applications are barred by limitation Proviso to Sub-s.(1) permits filing of an application for resumption within six months from the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, if the landlord is a minor, or a person of unsound mind, or a member of the armed forces or a seaman and the tenant is entitled to fixity of tenure, or a legal representative of such a member or seaman. The petitioner relies on this proviso in support of his applications. The objection to this is that the lands sought to be resumed are lands belonging to the Marumakkathayam tavazhi of the petitioner and the lease was given for and on behalf of the tavazhi and therefore though the lease was granted by the petitioner the petitioner is not the landlord and consequently he cannot fake advantage of the proviso to S.18(1) of the Act. This objection was not accepted by the Land Tribunal but accepted by the Appellate Authority. The question is whether the petitioner can be said to be the 'landlord' for the purpose of the proviso to S.18(1) of the Act.

(3.) A 'landlord' is defined in S.2(29) to mean 'a person under whom a tenant holds and includes a landowner' and a 'tenant' is defined to mean 'any person who has paid or has agreed to pay rent or other consideration for his being allowed to possess and to enjoy any land by a person entitled to lease that land'. The respondent is a tenant as defined. He is in possession and enjoyment of the land on the basis of a lease granted by the petitioner and it is not disputed the petitioner was entitled to lease the land. It is also not disputed that the petitioner is a karanavan of the tavazhi to which the lands belong. As karanavan the management of the tarwad is vested in the petitioner. He is entitled to lease the land in the course of his management. The expression 'landlord' finds a place in S.15, 16 and 18 of the Act. The right of a landlord to apply for resumption under S.14 to 17 is subject to the conditions and restrictions mentioned in S.18. Therefore, S.14 to 18 must be read together to find out the meaning of the expression 'landlord' mentioned in S.15 and 16. S.15 enables a landlord who needs the holding for the purpose of constructing a building bona fide for his own residence or for that of any member of his family to apply for resumption from his tenant. 'A member of his family' means in the case of a landlord who has granted a lease on behalf of a joint family, a member of such family (see Explanation to S.15). This shows that the karanavan who has granted a lease on behalf of a family is the landlord for the purpose of S.15. Further, it cannot be disputed that the karanavan of a tavazhi of a tarwad is a landlord. He is entitled to receive the rent and give a discharge. He is entitled to recover possession of a land from the tenant under the general law. The tact that his dealings are for and on behalf of the family does not mean that he is not a person under whom a tenant holds and it is in the larger sense that the expression 'landlord' is used in S.14 to 18 is clear from the Explanation to S.15 referred to above. S.18 is a protection given to a member of the armed forces. His inability to avail himself of the right to apply within one year is sought to be salvaged by giving him a permission to apply within six months of the amending Act. To say that that benefit is limited to the lease granted by him in his individual capacity and is not available if the lease was given for and on behalf of the tavazhi whose management vests in him is to ignore the intention of the Legislature to protect the members of the armed forces who, on account of other paramount reasons, are unable to protect their interests, whether their interests are individual or joint. Therefore, I hold that the expression 'landlord' is used in S.18 to mean a person who is one such either in his individual capacity or in the capacity of a person who has granted a lease on behalf of a joint family. In this view, the applications for resumption filed within six months of the amending Act are within time. The Appellate Authority is wrong in holding that the applications are barred.