CHANDY Vs. STATE OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The accused in C. C. 307/65 on the file of the First Class Magistrate's Court, Punalur is the revision Petitioner. He was prosecuted by the Food Inspector, Pathanapuram Public Health Centre under S.2, 7 (1) and 16 (1) (a) of the Prevent on of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, read with R.44 (b) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, as he was found in possession of adulterated curd intended for sale. On 15 6 65 at 9 a. m. the Food Inspector purchased from the accused 24 oz. of curd on payment of a price of 37 ps. and on analysis by the Public Analyst it was found to be below the standard prescribed by the Act as it contained about 42% of added water. He was accordingly convicted under the above sections and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-. On appeal before the Sessions Judge of Quilon the conviction was confirmed, but the sentence was reduced to simple imprisonment for one month and a fine of Rs. 200/-.

(2.) The conviction was challenged before this court on two grounds; firstly that there was no proper sanction to initiate the prosecution; and secondly, the charge is under 1954 Act, but the conviction has been entered under the amended Act of 1964 which the court was not competent to do. Learned counsel stated that the reasoning in State v. Shankar Dnyanoba Gambhire (1965-1 Cr. L. J. 145) is applicable to the facts of the present case and for the reasons stated therein he is entitled to an acquittal. In that case it was stated that the written consent contemplated by S.20(1) of the Act can be given by either the State Government or the local authority or a person authorised by the State Government or a person authorised by the local authority. In the present case sanction was accorded by the Panchayat by a resolution passed on 16 9 65. The resolution is perfectly in order and that is a sufficient compliance of the requirements of the section. The first objection, therefore, that there is no proper sanction to initiate the prosecution is without substance.

(3.) On the second point it was argued that in so far as the offence was committed after the coming into force of the amended Act (Act 49 of 1964), the prosecution ought to have been initiated under that Act and not the Act of 1954. From the charge it is seen that the prosecution was launched under Act 37 of 1954. This does not make any difference, because the parent Act which is still in force is Act 37 of 1954. It was by way of amendment of the said Act that Act 49 of 1964 was passed, Therefore, the prosecution will have to be launched under Act 37 of 1954 as amended by Act 49 of 1964 and that is what has been done in the present case also.