KUNHI MADHAVAN VAZHUNNAVAR Vs. ABDULLA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE plaintiff leased the suit property in 1934 to the defendant for putting up a building for the conduct of his trade. It is admitted that, soon after the lease, the defendant constructed a building on the property and has since then been running his trade therein. THE term of the lease having expired, the plaintiff has instituted this suit for his eviction; and the defendant claimed, inter alia , benefit of s. 78 of the Act IV of 1961 (now S. 106 of Act I of 1964 ). THE District Judge has accepted the defence and dismissed the prayer for resumption of the property. This appeal is from the District Judge.

(2.) COUNSEL read S. 106 of the Act I of 1964 thus: "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or in any other law, or in any contract, or order or decree of Court, where, on any land leased for commercial or industrial purpose the lessee has constructed buildings for such commercial or industrial purpose before the 18th December 1957, he shall not be liable to be evicted from such land, " and contended that to claim the benefit of the section the lease concerned should have been subsisting on the date of the Act. I do not feel persuaded by this contention. To me the expression "any land leased" in the section means any land that was leased; and the words "the lessee' in the context refer to the person to whom the lease was given. The construction of the building must have been by him as lessee. The words "the lessee" relate to the capacity of the person when he constructed the building. The phrase "has constructed before the 18th December 1957", as I have explained in Karunakaran Nair versus Ramakrishnan Nair (1966 K. L. T. 351) may imply that the construction should have been completed before the 18th December 1957 and the building must be subsisting at the relevant time. It is well settled that beneficent legislations must be construed liberally. In Sheik Gulfan v. Sanat Kumar (A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1839) a question arose as to the construction of s. 30 (c) of the Calcutta Thilka Tenancy Act when the supreme Court observed: " in deciding the true scope and effect of the relevant words in any statutory provision, the context in which the words occur, the object of the statute in which the provision is included and the policy underlying the statute assume relevance and become material. In construing the provisions of beneficent legislation, if two constructions are reasonably possible, the Court would be justified in preferring that construction which helps to carry out the beneficent purpose of the Act "the object of S. 106 of the Act I of 1964 is obviously to protect tenants who have with permission constructed buildings on others' lands to carry on their trade or business from being dislocated and disturbed in their business. Being a welfare legislation, the conditions for its applicability and the exceptions to its operation have to be sought in the legislation itself, construing it strictly and giving the benefit of doubt in its expression to the tenants for whose benefit it is designed. Viewed thus, I do not find any warrant in the section for the contention that the lease as such should have been subsisting on the date the Act came into force to entitle the defendant to the immunity under the section. The decision of the Court below appears to me right.