GOVINDAN NEELACANTAN Vs. VELAYUDHAN PILLAI MADHAVAN PILLAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant was a tenant, against whom a decree for eviction with arrears of rent was passed. In execution of the decree the property was also recovered from him prior to 11th April 1957. Execution was then taken for recovery of the arrears of rent, when the appellant claimed relief under S.34 of Act IV of 1961, which is replaced by S.73 of Act I of 1964. The primary court held that he was entitled to relief, while the lower appellate court reversed the decision of the execution court.

(2.) The reasoning of the Subordinate Judge is that for relief under S.34 of Act IV of 1961 the relationship of landlord and tenant must be subsisting at the time when relief is claimed. For this position the Subordinate Judge relies on the definition of the term 'tenant'. The term is defined in S.2(57) of Act I of 1964 (the definition was the same ia Act IV of 1961); and it means any person who has paid or has agreed to pay rent or other consideration for his being allowed by another to possess and to enjoy the land of the latter. From this the Subordinate Judge reasons that since the verb used is in the present tense, the relationship must be existing at the time when relief is claimed. I am afraid this approach of the Subordinate Judge is thoroughly erroneous. The definition can only be in the present tense, whether it related to a tenancy which subsisted at a past date or a tenancy which is to come into existence on a future date. From this fact alone it is wrong to conclude that the legislature did not intend to confer benefit, especially under S.73, on a person who is not a tenant at the moment. The wording of S.73, on the other hand, will indicate that the relationship of landlord and tenant to be considered is at the time when the arrears of rent accrued. S.73(1) reads that notwithstanding anything to the contrary etc., all arrears of rent accrued due from a tenant during the period and outstanding on the date specified in column (2) shall be deemed to be fully discharged by payment to the landlord, or deposit in court for payment to the landlord, of the amount referred to in the corresponding entry in column (3) etc. The expression "all arrears of rent accrued due from a tenant during the period and outstanding on the date specified in column (2)..." indicates, without any shadow of doubt, that the relevant time during which the relationship has to be taken into account was the period when the arrears accrued. It does not matter whether the landlord and tenant relationship continued thereafter or was terminated. I therefore hold that the appellant is entitled to claim benefits of S.73 of Act I of 1964.

(3.) The second appeal is allowed, the decision of the lower appellate court is set aside and the execution petition is remitted to the primary court for disposal afresh under S.73 of Act I of 1964. The respondent will pay the costs of the second appeal to the appellant. However, the order regarding costs of the lower courts will stand.