LAWS(KER)-1966-7-19

VASUDEVA MENON Vs. RATNAM

Decided On July 05, 1966
VASUDEVA MENON Appellant
V/S
RATNAM Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant and the respondent are governed by the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Act 22 of 1933). The appellant had married the respondent. The appellant the husband, filed O. P. No. 71 of 1956 in the Munsiff's Court, Ottapalam, under S.7 of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act for dissolution of his marriage with the respondent. Since the Ottapalam court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition it was re-presented by the appellant before the Munsiff's Court, Chowghat and it was numbered O. P. No. 33 of 1957. The Madras Marumakkathayam Act in its application to the District of Malabar was amended by the Madras Marumakkathayam (Amendment) Act, 1958 (Act 26 of 1958) by which S.10-A and 10-B were introduced. Act 26 of 1958 came into force on 25th April 1958. S.10-A provides for maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings to the wife or the husband on their application. S.10-B provides for the payment of permanent alimony and maintenance to be paid to the wife or the husband during the period the applicant remains unmarried. The respondent before us filed I. A. 453 of 1958 on 31st May 1958 claiming relief under S.10-A and 10-B of the Act against the appellant. The learned Munsiff allowed the claim for maintenance under S.10-A from 25th April 1958 the date on which the Amendment Act came into force, and also allowed maintenance under S.10-B from the date of the dissolution of the marriage till the respondent gets remarried. This order was confirmed by the learned Judge.

(2.) The order for dissolution of the marriage was passed on 11th March 1959. I. A. 453 of 1958 claiming relief under S.10-A and 10-B of the Act was filed by the respondent on 31st May 1958. ft was contended on behalf of the appellant that S.10-A and 10-B are not applicable to proceedings pending on the date of Act 26 of 1958 but the provisions would apply only to proceedings commenced after the date of the said Act. According to the learned advocate for the appellant when the Madras Marumakkathayam (Amendment) Act (Act 26 of 1958) came into force his client had become as of right entitled to get an order of dissolution under S.9 of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act as it stood before the amendment and if the provisions of S.10-A and 10-B of Act 26 of 1958, are applied to pending proceedings vested rights would be affected. In support of his contention the learned advocate relied on the decision of this court in Krishnan v. Kousallya 1962 KLT 425 . The question that was considered in the said decision was whether an application filed under S.10-B of the Act after the passing of the order dissolving a marriage is a valid application. Vaidialingam, J. observed thus "the natural and reasonable interpretation to be placed on S.10-B and especially on the words occurring in sub-section (1) of S.10-B 'any court exercising jurisdiction under this chapter' must really be that it relates to the time when the court exercises jurisdiction by way of receiving an application for dissolution of marriage under S.7 and when it passes an order of dissolution of marriage under S.9 of the Act". This decision is therefore no authority to support the contention of the appellant, that the relief under S.10-B is available only in cases where the application for dissolution is filed after the date of the Amendment Act 26 of 1958. The decision in Kunhikannan Nair v. Madhu 1961 KLJ 812 also does not afford us any guidance in the decision of the question raised before us. The effect of S.10-A and 10-B of the Madras Marumakkathayam (Amendment) Act is to declare certain rights in favour of a wife or a husband who are parties to an application for dissolution. In the case before as interim maintenance was granted only from the date of Act 26 of 1958 and maintenance under S.10-B was granted only from the date of the order dissolving the marriage. There is no claim before us by the respondent that interim maintenance under S.10-A of Act 26 of 1958 should have been granted from the date of the petition for dissolution of marriage. The general scheme of Act 26 of 1958 shows that S.10-A and 10-B are intended to apply to pending proceedings also. The right of the appellant to have the marriage dissolved is not in any way affected by the provisions contained in S.10-A and 10-B of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act. The effect of the introduction of S.10-A and 10-B is to enable the parties to an application for dissolution to get the necessary expenses and maintenance during the pendency of an application for dissolution and get permanent alimony and maintenance after an order for dissolution was passed. There is nothing in the Act or in S.10-A and 10-B to limit the application of those provisions to proceedings commenced after the date of the Act. On the other hand the wording of S.10-A and 10-B of the Act is wide enough to apply to proceedings pending on the date of the Act. Thus it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned advocate for the appellant that vested rights are affected by applying the provisions of S.10-A and 10-B to the pending proceedings.

(3.) The learned advocate for the appellant relying on the decision in Krishnan v. Kousallya 1962 KLT 425 already referred to, raised a further contention that I. A. 453 of 1958 was disposed of only after the order of dissolution of marriage which was passed on 11th March 1959 and the court has no jurisdiction to grant any reliefs either under S.10-A or 10-B of the Madras Marumakkathayam (Amendment) Act, 1958 (Act 26 of 1958) after the order for dissolution of the marriage. We do not think that the decision in Krishnan v. Kousallya 1962 KLT 425 supports the contention of the learned advocate for the appellant. In the case which was decided in Krishnan v. Kousallya 1962 KLT 425 the application for reliefs under S.10-A and 10-B was filed only after the order of dissolution of the marriage. The learned advocate for the appellant relied on the observations of Vaidialingam, J. already quoted in the earlier portion of this judgment namely, "the natural and reasonable interpretation to be placed on S.10-B and especially on the words occurring in sub-section (1) of S.10-B 'any court exercising jurisdiction under this chapter' must really be that it relates to the time when the court exercises jurisdiction by way of receiving an application' or dissolution of marriage under S.7 and when it passes an order of dissolution of marriage under S.9 of the Act". We do not think that this passage relied on by the learned advocate for the appellant supports the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant. The learned Judge was not considering the question whether the court was competent to pass an order allowing reliefs under S.10-A and 10-B of the Act subsequent to an order of dissolution of marriage under S.9 of the Act. The learned Judge was only concerned with the competency of the court to receive an application for reliefs under S.10-A and 10-B of the Act after the passing of an order under S.9. This is clear from the following observations of the learned Judge contained at page 739: