SUBRAMONIA IYER Vs. STATE OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Government Pleader, on behalf of the respondent (the State), takes a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this civil revision petition. He contends that under S. 39 (1) (v) of the Arbitration Act an appeal is provided against the order of the lower court; and that therefore, this Court need not exercise its revisional powers under S. 115 of the Code of civil Procedure.

(2.) SRI. T. N. Subramonia Iyer, the counsel of the petitioner, meets this objection in the following manner. He contends that under S. 34 of the Act stay can be sought only before filing the written statement or taking any other steps in the proceedings; that stay has been granted in this case after taking such "other steps" in the proceedings by way of several adjournments; that such grant of stay is beyond the competence of the lower court under S. 34 and hence without jurisdiction; and that thus the matter involves a question of jurisdiction under S. 115 of the code. The counsel argues further that the stay contemplated under S. 39 (1) (v) of the Act is only one granted under S. 34; and that since in the present case stay has been granted after steps in the proceedings were taken by the respondent, it is without jurisdiction.

(3.) THE counsel then draws my attention to two decisions, one by Chandra Reddy J. in Puppalla Ramulu v. Nagidi Appalaswami (AIR. 1957 and. Pra. 1) and the other by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Yugal kishore Sinha v. Nagendra Prasad Yaday (AIR. 1964 Pat. 542 ). THE decision of chandra Reddy J. says that even assuming an appeal is competent, the right of the High Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction is not taken away to correct errors that come to its notice under S. 115 of the Code. In the decision of the Patna High Court it is observed that even assuming that the stay granted was not under S. 31, 32 and 34 but under the inherent powers of the court, still, if the ends of justice required final adjudication of all controversies raised by the parties, the High Court could interfere under S. 115 of the Code. Lastly, Sri. Subramonia Iyer cites one decision of the Supreme Court and four decisions of this court, one of which being a Division Bench ruling. THE supreme Court in Major S. S. Khanna v. Brig. F. J. Dillon (AIR. 1964 S. C. 497)has said: "if an appeal lies against the adjudication directly to the High Court, or to another court from the decision of which an appeal lies to the High Court, it has no power to exercise its revisional jurisdiction, but where the decision itself is not appealable to the High Court directly or indirectly, exercise of the revisional jurisdiction by the High court would not be deemed excluded. " THE three decisions by single judges of this Court are martha Nicholas v. Yesamma (1961 KLT. 927), Gopalakrishnan Nair v. Subhadra amma (1961 KLT. 930) and Vasu v. Narayanan Nambooripad (1961 KLT. 946 ). In these decisions it has been held that if an appeal lay to a subordinate court and not to the High Court, the High Court's power of revision would not be excluded by the language of S. 115 of the Code. THE fourth decision, a Division bench ruling of this Court, is in Narayanan Nambiar v. Ambu Kunhi (1964 KLT. 591), wherein the decision of the Supreme Court has been followed; and the division Bench has observed that if an appeal lay directly or indirectly to the high Court, the revisional powers of the High Court are excluded.