KESAVA PILLAI Vs. SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT OF POST OFFICES

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner who was the postman in the Tirumala Post Office during the period from 4-10-1963 to 3-2-1964 was charged with gross carelessness and negligence for non observance of the provisions of R.709(1) and 709(3) of Chap.13 of the Post and Telegraphic Manual, Volume VI in effecting payment of amounts covered by the three money orders specified in the charge. The charge was enquired into and found proved by the Enquiring Authority. The petitioner was thereupon served with a show cause notice against the proposed punishment of dismissal from service. After considering the petitioner's representations, by proceedings of the Disciplinary Authority (Ex. P3) the enquiry report was accepted and the proposed punishment of dismissal from service was inflicted upon the petitioner. This writ petition as originally filed was to quash Ex. P-3. The petitioner would appear to have preferred an appeal against the Ex. P-3 order and subsequent to the filing of the O.P., the appellate authority dismissed the appeal. The petitioner thereafter filed an "additional petition", C.M.P. No. 8006 of 1966. Ex. P-4 was filed along with it, as a copy of the appellate order and the petitioner prayed that Ex. P-3 and Ex. P-4 orders may be quashed. C.M.P. No. 8006 of 1966 is really a petition to amend the prayer in the O.P. so as to quash the appellate order Ex. P-4 also. Treated as such, the C.M.P. was allowed.

(2.) In support of his prayer, to quash Exs. P-3 and P-4 orders, the petitioner's counsel urged that the enquiry was violative of the principles of natural justice and that R.709(1) and (3) referred to in the charge are really not applicable to the case. I am not prepared to accept the petitioner's contention that the enquiry was violative of the principles of natural justice. The point appears to have been raised by the petitioner in answer to the show-cause notice issued by the Disciplinary Authority. It has been listed as the second point raised by the petitioner in support of his contention in Para.7 (at page 8) of Ex. P-3. Discussing the point, the Disciplinary Authority observed that the petitioner had not requested for the evidence of the persons to whom the amounts covered by the money-orders were paid, nor insisted on their presence at the enquiry. Having regard to these facts, I am not prepared to entertain the petitioner's objection that there was violation of the principles of natural justice at the stage of the enquiry, by reason of the persons to whom the amounts covered by the money-orders were paid not having been called as witness and by reason of certain statements made by them, having been used in evidence in the absence of such examination.

(3.) It is also to be noted that the Disciplinary Authority has discussed the case and the evidence against the petitioner after an analysis of the various aspects in Para.9 of Ex. P-3. It is difficult to see from the said discussion contained in Para.9 that the finding of guilt against the petitioner was rested solely or entirely on the statements now objected to by the petitioner.