STATE Vs. ANTHONI RAPPAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by the State against the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge of Trichur, in Criminal Appeal 6 of 1955, by which the learned Judge set aside the conviction and sentence passed by the Additional First Class Magistrate, Chalakudy, against the accused in C.C. 52 of 1954 on his file, for alleged contravention of Clause.18(i) of the Paddy (Acquisition and Movement) Control Order, 1952 read with S.7(2)(a) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (XXIV of 1946). On the morning of 28.6.1953 at about 8.45 A.M. the accused was found in possession of 21 paras and 4 edangalies of rice without a permit from the Grain Purchasing authority. Clause.17 of the Paddy (Acquisition and Movement) Control Order, 1952, prohibited a non producer or ration card holder from purchasing more than 15 paras of rice at a time except under a permit and Clause.18(i) prohibited possession by such a person of more than 15 paras of rice, except under a permit. The two courts below concurrently found that the accused held stock of 21 paras and 4 edangalies of rice without a permit. A faint argument that the two concerned clauses of the Paddy (Acquisition and Movement) Control Order did not prohibit purchase of as many 15 paras of rice as a person desired and to stock the quantity so purchased, was rightly repelled by the lower courts. The Trial Court found that the accused had contravened Clause.18(i), convicted him for it under S.7(1)(a) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment till the arising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 51 or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five weeks. On appeal the learned Sessions Judge set aside the conviction and sentence on the ground that on 24.2.1955 when the Trial Courts judgment was pronounced there was no law in force under which the conviction and sentence could have been passed.

(2.) Before us Mr. M. Bhaskara Menon, appearing for the accused respondent, did not seek to canvass the correctness of the finding of fact arrived at by the two courts below that his client was as alleged by the prosecution found in possession of 21 paras and 4 edangalies of rice without a permit from the concerned authority. He, however, contended that the appellate court was right in its view that the Trial Courts conviction and sentence cannot be sustained. We regret we cannot accede to the argument.

(3.) The appellate courts view that the conviction was bad is based on the fact that as the Paddy (Acquisition and Movement) Control Order was recalled with effect from 10.7.1954 by the Rice (Removal of Control) Order, 1954, the Trial Court could not have proceeded with the case against the respondent after that date or convicted and sentenced him. The learned Sessions Judge founded this on the well known rule that after the expiration of a temporary Statute, in the absence of provision to the contrary, no proceedings can be taken on it, and proceedings already commenced, ipso facto determine. Here the prosecution was commenced in 1953 itself, long before the recalling of the Paddy (Acquisition and Movement) Control Order by the Rice (Removal of Control) Order, 1954, but it so happened that the case was disposed of only on 24.2.1955. The learned Judges attention was invited to S.1(3) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, but he held that the provision contained there applied only when the Act expired by efflux of time and not when the offending Order has, as in this case, been recalled by a subsequent Order. In other words, according to the learned Judge, as the Paddy (Acquisition and Movement) Control Order was recalled by the Rice (Removal of Control) Order, 1954, the provision in S.1(3) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act had no application. The learned Judge rightly pointed out that the question of the duration of the provision of a temporary statute is a matter of construction and that had there been a saving clause, the prosecution could have been continued, notwithstanding the Rice (Removal of Control) Order of 1954 and that in that event, on the facts found, the accused could have been convicted and sentenced. However referring to S.1(3) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act the learned Judge said: The Section deals only with the expiration of the time specified in the Act. This is not a case of the prescribed time running out. It is a case of the offending Order being cancelled before the expiry of the time. The effect of the cancellation is to wipe off the offences mentioned in the cancelled Order. So saying he accepted the argument on behalf of the appellant before him, allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and the sentence.