(1.) THE question involved in all these revision petitions is the same and it is whether the Anjikaimal District Court at Ernakulam acted illegally in returning the appeals referred to in its impugned orders on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to entertain those appeals. THE appeals thus returned are A. S. Nos. 128/55,119/55,126/55,125/55 and 127/55 on the file of that Court. THEse appeals are against the decrees passed on 23. 5. 1955 by the ernakulam District Munsiff's Court in O. S. 697/1952, 683/52, 725/52, 723/52 and 696/52 on its file. THE properties involved in all these suits are in the chowara Village which was within the jurisdiction of the Ernakulam Munsiff's court at the time of the institution of the suits and also at the time of their disposal by the District Munsiff at Ernakulam. Subsequently on account of territorial re-adjustment Chowara Village was brought under the jurisdiction of the District Munsiff's Court at Perumabvoor. Such a re-adjustment of territorial jurisdiction was brought about by a notification published by the government in exercise of the powers vested in them under S. 11 of the travancore-Cochin Civil Courts Act (Act XXII of 1951 ). THE notification was published in a Gazette extraordinary dated 12th August 1955 and the territorial re-adjustments indicated in the notification were to come into effect on the 17th August 1955. S. 11 of the Civil Courts Act under which this notification was issued states: "government shall fix and may from time to time vary the local limits of the jurisdiction of any of the Courts referred to in s. 4. " THE notification itself runs as follows: "in exercise of the powers vested in them under S. 11 of the Travancore-Cochin Civil Courts Act (Act XXII of 1951 as amended to date), on and from 17th August 1955 Government are pleased to vary and fix anew the local limits of the jurisdiction of the several Civil Courts appearing in the sub-joined schedule as indicated therein. "
(2.) THE question is whether by virtue of the aforesaid notification the Anjikaimal District Court at Ernakulam has ceased to have jurisdiction to entertain the appeals against the decrees passed by the ernakulam District Munsiff's Court in the cases already referred to and whether the appeals have to be presented to the Parur District Court having appellate jurisdiction over the Perumbavoor District Munsiff's Court to which the territorial jurisdiction over Chowara Village was transferred, subsequent to the disposal of the suits by the Ernakulam Munsiff's Court. THE Ernakulam munsiff's Court was and is even now under the appellate jurisdiction of the anjikaimal District Court. THE general provision defining the jurisdiction of the appellate courts in the matter of entertaining appeals from the subordinate courts is contained in S. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sub-s. 1 of that section is in the following terms: "save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed in any court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of such Courts. " THE decrees in question were passed by the Ernakulam munsiff's Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction and the court authorised to hear appeals against such decrees is the Anjikaimal District court. THE Parur District Court has no appellate jurisdiction over the ernakulam Munsiff's Court. Even though the village wherein the properties involved in these suits are situate has subsequently been brought within the jurisdiction of the Perumbavoor Munsiff's Court, the decrees in these suits can in no sense be deemed to be decrees passed by the Perumbavoor Munsiff's Court. THE decrees having been passed by the Ernakulam Munsiff's Court the appeals against such decrees must necessarily be to the Anjikaimal District Court which is the court having appellate jurisdiction over the Ernakulam Munsiff's Court. THE provisions contained in R. 23 and 25 of O. XLI of the Code of Civil procedure also lend support of this view. R. 23 directs that where the appellate court fees that re-trial of the case is necessary the decree under appeal may be set aside and the case remanded to the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred with directions to re-admit the suit under its original number in the register of civil suits and proceed to determine the suit. R. 25 states that the appellate court may frame additional issues that may be found necessary for a proper disposal of the suit and refer such issues to the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred with directions to try the issues and record findings thereon and to submit such findings together with the evidence recorded at the trial of those issues to the appellate court. THEse provisions clearly indicate that a court in which a suit has been properly instituted retains its jurisdiction to deal with the suit at all stages up to its logical termination unless the case is transferred to another court by order of a superior court or unless such jurisdiction is vested by any express provision of law. This position holds good not only in the matter of the trial of the suit, but also in the matter of appeals and also of the execution of the decree that may be passed in the suit. This is not a mere matter of procedure, but is a matter of substantive right so far as the parties to the suit are concerned. This position is explained by Lord Macnaghten in Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Iriving (1905) A. C. 369 ). THE question for decision in that case was whether an appeal to His Majesty the King in Council could be entertained subsequent to the passing of the Australian Commonwealth Judiciary Act of 1903, under which appeals against the decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland had to be filed in the High Court of Australia. Till the passing of the Judiciary Act of 1903 the suitors had the right to prefer such appeals to the King in Council. THE judgment appealed against in that case was passed on September 4,1903 in an action which had commenced long prior to the passing of the Judiciary Act of 1903. Leave was granted by the Supreme Court of Queensland for an appeal being preferred to the King in Council against the decree passed by the Supreme Court on September. THE respondent moved by a petition that the appeal should be dismissed as incompetent on the ground that the right to appeal to the King in Council had been taken away by the Judiciary Act of 1903 under which the appeal had to be preferred to the High Court of Australia. In dealing with that petition Lord macnaghten observed as follows: "as regards the general principles applicable to the case there was no controversy. On the one hand, it was not disputed that if the matter in question be a matter of procedure only, the petition is well founded. On the other hand if it be more than a matter of procedure, if it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act, it was conceded that, in accordance with a long line of authorities extending from the time of Lord Coke to the present day, the appellants would be entitled to succeed. THE Judiciary act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intendment. And therefore the only question is, was the Appeal to His Majesty in Council a right vested in the appellants at the date of the passing of the Act, or was it a mere matter of procedure? It seems to their Lordships that the question does not admit of doubt. To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of rights is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested. " To the same effect is the decision of the Federal Court of India in Venugopal v. Krishnaswami (AIR 1943 Federal Court 24) where the decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving (1905 AC 369) was cited and followed. THE question for decision in Venugopal v. Krishnaswami (AIR 1943 federal Court 24) was whether the separation of Burma from India in the year 1937 had the effect of depriving the Trichinopoly Court of its jurisdiction to continue a suit in respect of the properties which were situated in Burma. THE suit was instituted in the year 1932 when Burma was part of India and some of the items of properties included in the suit were those situated in trichinopoly while the remaining items were properties situated in Burma. THEre was no dispute on the question that the suit was properly commenced and that the court was competent to adjudicate upon the claims relating to both these sets of properties. THE Federal Court ruled that a right to continue a duly instituted suit is in the nature of a vested right and it cannot be taken away except by a clear indication to that effect in the subsequent enactment or statutory notification limiting the jurisdiction of the court which had already entertained the suit in the proper exercise of the jurisdiction it had at the time of the institution of the suit. It was also pointed out that: "the true position is not whether there is any express provision permitting the continuance of pending proceedings but whether there is any clear indication against the continuance of pending proceedings to their normal termination. " Applying these tests to the facts of that case it was found that there was no clear indication in the Constitution Act by which Burma was separated from India, that the right to continue a suit properly commenced in Trichinopoly Court in respect of Burma properties also was taken away and that, therefore, the Trichinopoly Court retained its jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of the court even with respect to the properties situated in burma. This question of jurisdiction has been reiterated and emphasised by the Supreme Court in Raman v. Nallappuraju (AIR 1956 SC 87 ). THEre the question was one of jurisdiction to execute a decree. In that connection the scope of S. 37, 38 & 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure was examined and it was ruled as follows:- "it is settled, law that the Court which actually passed the decree does not lose its jurisdiction to execute it, by reason of the subject-matter thereof being transferred subsequently to the jurisdiction of another Court. "but the Court to whose jurisdiction the subject-matter of the decree is transferred acquires inherent jurisdiction over the same by reason of such transfer, and if it entertains an execution application with reference thereto, it would at the worst be an irregular assumption of jurisdiction and not a total absence of it, and if objection to it is not taken at the earliest opportunity, it must be deemed to have been waived, and cannot be raised at any later stage of the proceedings. "
(3.) IN the result all these revision petitions are allowed and the orders in question are set aside. The lower court is directed to re-admit all these appeals to its file and to proceed with them in accordance with law and in the light of the observation made above.