(1.) THE petitioner was a clerk in the Excise Department of the Travancore State. He is at present an officiating assistant Sales Tax Officer in the service of the Government of travancore-Cochin. THE history of his service till the date of Ext. A (6. 7. 1954) is sketched as follows in Para. 7 to 11 of the affidavit in support of the petition: 7. I was originally an employee in the Excise Department of the then Travancore State. While I was a clerk in that department in the scale of pay of Rs. 45-75 getting Rs. 65 as pay i was appointed as Assistant Sales Tax Officer of the Sales Tax Department of the Travancore State in the same scale of pay viz. , 45-75 as per G. O. Roc. 3495/49 Devpt. dated 19th May 1949. I took charge on 18. 10. 1124, corresponding to 31. 5. 1949. 8. On 1. 4. 1950, I was promoted to the scale of pay of Rs. 80-100, in the same Department. 9. While I was acting in the above grade the Agrl. Income-tax and Sale-tax Department of the Travancore-Cochin State was brought into being. This was on 12. 5. 1950. 10. On 7. 7. 1951 1 was promoted to the scale of Rs. 100-125 in the same post in the same department. Subsequently I was promoted as manager in the office of the Deputy Commissioner of the Agricultural Income-tax and Sales-tax at Trivandrum and this was in the scale of Rs. 125-150. 11. THEreafter, I was appointed as acting Sales-tax officer in the scale of Rs. 125-175 and while I was acting as Sales-Tax Officer at Alwaye the order of integration of services in the Agricultural Income-Tax and Sales-Tax Department of the State viz. , the above Ext. B was passed and my rank was fixed in the list Ext. A".
(2.) EXT. A is the list attached to EXT. B an order of the government dated the 6th July 1954. In that list the petitioner is ranked as the 16th among the officiating Assistant Sales Tax Officers on the scale of Rs. 100-125. According to him he should be not the 16th but the 6th or in other words, respondents 2 to 11 should not have been ranked above him as has been done in EXT. A.
(3.) THE main question, therefore, that arises for determination is the scope, character and effect of Ext. B. According to the petitioner the contents of Ext. B constitute rules framed under the proviso to art. 309 of the Constitution and according to the learned Government Pleader they are nothing more than mere directions issued in exercise of the executive power of the State. If the petitioner's contention cannot be upheld and the learned Government Pleader is right in his submission there can be no doubt that even if the provisions of Ext. B have been violated as alleged such violation will not enable us to interfere under Art. 226 of the Constitution.