(1.) This appeal arises from an order in execution of a decree for recovery of possession of property with rent past and future. The decree was passed on 31-11950. The first execution petition filed on 26-10-1950 was dismissed for default on 19-2-1951. The next execution petition was filed on 23-7-1955 and the prayer was for recovery of the amount decreed as rent. The judgment-debtor filed objections contending that execution of the decree was barred by limitation and that the amount claimed was not due. These objections were over-ruled and he has preferred this appeal.
(2.) The two points which arise for decision are: (1) Whether execution is barred by limitation? and (2) Whether the amount claimed by the decree-holder is due under the decree?
(3.) As regards the question of limitation, the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant was that the decree was not a registered one and that the second execution petition being one filed beyond a period of three years from the date of disposal of the earlier petition, was barred under Article 182 of the Limitation Act. As the suit was one for recovery of property on the basis of a lease, the plaintiff paid registration fees also along with the plaint, The defendant did not specifically raise a plea that the decree was not registered & the decree-holder was therefore not bound to state or prove that the decree was registered. The learned Judge held on the basis of a Full Bench decision of the Travancore; High Court reported in 1946 Trav LR 409 (A) that even if registration had not been effected due to any mistake or omission of the court, such mistake could not disentitle the decree-holder of the benefit of a period of six years under Article 152. There are certain earlier decisions holding a contrary view but so far as this 'case is concerned it is unnecessary to consider the matter further in the absence of a specific plea that the decree was not registered. Learned counsel for the, appellant contended that the decree was actually registered and that tin's objection not having been specifically raised he did not prove the' same. We hold that the court below was right in treating the decree as a registered one.