ELIZABETH ANTONY Vs. K J GEORGE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Second Appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of arrears of house rent as also money lent. It was filed originally in the Munsiff's Court at Alleppey as O.S. No. 668 of 1950 but transferred to the Cochin Munsiff's Court, because the house in question was situated and the defendant tenant resided, in Cochin. We are concerned in this appeal only with the question of arrears of rent. There were disallowed to the plaintiff concurrently by both the courts and hence this Second Appeal by the plaintiff.

(2.) The tenant defendant - came into occupation on 22.1.1122 and was regular in the payment of the agreed rent at the rate of Rs. 125 per mensem till 22.5.1125 corresponding to 6.1.1950. He defaulted for 8 months thereafter and so the claim was made for the arrears. Subsequent to the institution of the suit, the tenant applied for and obtained order dated 21.4.1952 under S.4 of the Travancore - Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Order, 1950, fixing the fair rent for the house at Rs. 61-1-8 pies. S.6(c) of the Order provided.

(3.) In the courts below the contention had been raised but unsuccessfully on behalf of the plaintiff that the Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Order, 1950, was as a whole ultra vires, and could not, therefore, be applied to the plaintiff's prejudice. Before me, learned Counsel for the plaintiff questions only S.6 Cl. (c) of the Control Order as ultra vires and to the extent it provide for a refund or adjustment of rent paid before the date of the coming into force of the Control Order itself on 17.8.1950. The argument is that the 1950 Order was only a subordinate legislation by the Executive Government "in exercise of powers conferred by S.13 of the Public Safety Measures Act V of 1950 (T-C) and S.13, according to learned Counsel, did not specifically reserve a power in the Executive Government to legislate with retrospective effect. It is no doubt true that the delegate of legislative authority does not possess plenary power to give the subordinate delegated legislation retrospective operation unless and until that power is expressly conferred by the parent enactment. But it should not be forgotten that to ascertain the intention of the parent legislation, regard should be had to the general scope and purview of the enactment, to the remedy sought to be applied, to the former state of the law and to what was in the contemplation of the legislature. So, if there are words in the enactment which either expressly or by necessary intendment imply that the Statute should be given retrospective operation, the Courts will have no other alternative than to give such operation.