BINDHU Vs. THIRUVANANTHAPURAM SERVICE CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner was working as a Pharmacist in a Neethi Medical Store being operated by the 1st respondent Bank (hereinafter referred to as 'the Management'). Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against her, and a punishment of dismissal from service was imposed, effective from 6/11/2012. The petitioner initiated proceedings under Sec. 2A (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the I.D. Act') before the Labour Court, Kollam, as the conciliation before the District Labour Officer did not reach any conclusion. The Labour Court registered the application as I.D. No.9/2019 and by Ext.P2 award dtd. 29/9/2023 set aside the disciplinary proceedings and remitted the matter, reserving the liberty of the management to initiate fresh disciplinary proceedings starting from the stage of issuance of charge memo. However, noting the fact that the petitioner was dismissed from service in the year 2012, it was directed that the fresh proceedings shall be initiated and concluded within the period of three months from the date of the award, namely, 29/9/2023. It was further directed that on failure to complete the proceedings within the time limit, the management shall reinstate the petitioner in service with all benefits. The management moved Ext.P3 application dtd. 18/3/2024 for extension of time to complete the proceedings. It was stated that though the time given for completion of disciplinary proceedings was three months from 29/9/2023, the award was available to the management only on 19/12/2023. The steps taken for holding and completing fresh disciplinary proceedings in terms of the findings in Ext.P2 award were also stated in Ext.P3. In the circumstances mentioned in Ext.P3, the management sought a further period of three months for completion of the disciplinary proceedings. By Ext.P5 order dtd. 28/6/2024, the Labour Court granted a further period of one and a half (1 1/2) months to complete the disciplinary proceedings. The petitioner is before this Court challenging Ext.P5 on various grounds.

(2.) The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently contends that the Labour Court cannot extend the time limit. He submits that, going by the provisions of Sec. 17A of the I.D. Act, the award became enforceable within 30 days of publication. It is pointed out that the Interlocutory Application filed for extension of time was so filed beyond the period specified in Sec. 17A of the I.D. Act and therefore, it was not maintainable. It is submitted that, when the award became enforceable in terms of the provisions contained in the I.D. Act, the Labour Court became functus officio. It is submitted that the petitioner has been continuously harassed by the management, and the Police had registered Crime No.573/2011 against the President of the Bank for offences punishable under Ss. 294(b), 354, and 509 of the IPC on the complaint of the petitioner. It is submitted that the said case is now pending as C.C.No.1006/2012 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Thiruvananthapuram. It is submitted that, though the petitioner raised objections to the maintainability of the Interlocutory Application for extension of time, the Labour Court failed to consider the legal aspects and extended the time for completion of disciplinary proceedings through the impugned order. It is submitted that the normal age of superannuation of the petitioner was 30/5/2025, and by the extension of time granted, the management was attempting to deny the petitioner her rightful claim for reinstatement. It is submitted that the petitioner has been unemployed from 2011 onwards, and the management has been acting to the prejudice of the petitioner intentionally and on account of mala fides. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jammu Tehsil v. Hakumar Singh, (2006) 12 SCC 193 to contend that since after the period of 30 days from the date of the publication of the award, the award has become enforceable, the Labour Court has become functus officio and could not have considered the application for extension of time.

(3.) Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent Management would submit that the question as to whether the Labour Court becomes functus officio within a period of 30 days from the date of publication of the award in terms of the provisions contained in Sec. 17 and 17A of the I.D. Act was considered by a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Haryana Suraj Malting Ltd. v. Phool Chand, (2018) 16 SCC 567. It is submitted that in the said judgment, the Supreme Court has noticed the judgment in Jammu Tehsil (supra) and has taken the view that the Tribunal/Labour Court functioning under the provisions of the I.D. Act, had all incidental and ancillary powers and could entertain applications even beyond the period of 30 days and after the award became enforceable in terms of the provisions contained in Ss. 17 and 17A of the I.D. Act. The learned counsel appearing for the management also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chinnamarkathian alias Muthu Gounder v. Ayyavoo alias Periana Gounder, (1982) 1 SCC 159, to contend that the Labour Court retains the power to extend the time, taking note of future events. It is submitted that, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there were sufficient reasons mentioned in the application for extension of time that would justify the grant of time. The learned counsel also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Paul D.V v. Manisha Lalwani, (2010) 8 SCC 546, to contend that where sufficient cause is shown, every court retains the inherent jurisdiction to grant an extension of time.