(1.) The revision petitioner herein challenges the conviction and sentence against him under S.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short, 'the NI Act') in a prosecution brought by the 1st respondent herein as CC No. 44/2009 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kodungallur, on the allegation that a cheque for Rs.1,00,000.00 issued by him was bounced due to insufficiency of funds. The revision petitioner entered appearance before the learned Magistrate and pleaded not guilty. The complainant examined himself as PW 1, and proved Exts. P1 to P6 documents. The accused examined herself as DW 1. On an appreciation of the evidence adduced, the Trial Court found the accused guilty. On conviction she was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment till rising of the Court, and to pay a compensation of Rs.1 Lakh to the complainant, by judgment dated 02/12/2009. Aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction, the accused approached the Court of Session with Crl. A. No. 1009/2009. In appeal the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Irinjalakkuda, confirmed the conviction and sentence, by judgment dated 30/07/2015.
(2.) On hearing both sides, and on a perusal of the materials, I find no scope or reason to interfere in the concurrent findings made by the Courts below on facts. The complainant has well proved the transaction in which Ext. P1 cheque was issued by the accused, including due execution. This evidence stands not, in any manner, discredited. Bouncing of the cheque was proved by Exts. P2 and P3 documents. The accused has no case that he had sufficient funds in his account, or that the cheque was bounced on some other ground. Ext. P4 statutory notice was sent by the complainant in time, to which the accused did not reply. The complaint was also brought within time. Thus, I find that the case on facts stands well proved by the evidence of the complainant himself, and compliance of all statutory requirements also stands proved. The presumption available to the complainant under S.139 of the NI Act stands not rebutted. I find that the conviction is liable to be confirmed in revision also. The sentence also does not require interference, because the substantive sentence, is the minimum possible under the law, and the Trial Court directed payment of compensation with a view to do substantive justice to the complainant. This direction also does not require interference.
(3.) The learned counsel for the revision petitioner made a request to grant some reasonable time to the revision petitioner to make payment of the compensation. The request is for six months. I feel it appropriate to grant time for six months to the revision petitioner to make payment of the compensation. In the result, this revision is dismissed in limine, without being admitted to files, however, granting time for six months to the revision petitioner to surrender before the Trial Court to serve out the sentence and to make payment of the compensation voluntarily, on failure of which steps shall be taken by the Trial Court to enforce the sentence and to recover the amount of compensation, or enforce the default sentence.