ARINGATH KELAN Vs. STATE OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In all these cases, after the disposal of the revisions, petitions have been filed by the accused seeking enlargement of time for payment of the compensation ordered to be paid under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. It was then felt as to whether enlargement of time if granted in these applications would not amount to review of that part of the final orders passed in the revision thereby offending Section 362 Cr.P.C. The learned Counsel for the applicants argued that it would not amount to review of that part of the final order and that even if it would amount to review, the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C was wide enough to overwrite Section 362 Cr.P.C. The arguments were mainly addressed by Adv. Sri. Sunny Mathew and Adv. Shri. A.X. Varghese.

(2.) Interpreting Section 561A of the 1898 Code, a three Judges' Bench of the Supreme Court in Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar and Anr., 1964 CrLJ 1 observed that the High Court sitting in appeal in a suitable case could judicially correct the observations of the lower court by recourse to its inherent power under Section 561A Cr.P.C but cautioned that the said power must be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interest of the party concerned would irrevocably suffer otherwise. In Raj Kapoor and Ors. v. State Delhi Administration and Ors., 1980 CrLJ 202 a two Judges' Bench of the Apex Court had to consider whether the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would stand repelled, when the revisional power under Section 397 overlapsed. It was observed that there would not be any bar in exercising the inherent power in view of the opening words of Section 482 itself which says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The overriding words at the beginning of the Section were held to be wide enough to circumvent even the power of revision under Section 397 of the Code. Again in Puran v. Rambilas and Anr., 2001 CrLJ 2566 a two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court reiterated that the bar under Section 397(3) does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The position was further reinstated by two judges of the Apex Court again in Mary Angel and Ors. v. State of T.N., 1999 CrLJ 3513 to say that Section 482 Cr.P.C is not controlled or curtailed by any of the provisions of the very same Code. In Dinesh Dutt Joshi v. State of Rajasthan, 2001 CrLJ 4697 , the question arose before a two Judges' Bench of the Apex Court as to whether the power under Section 482 could be exercised to fill any procedural lacunae and it was held that the inherent power could be exercised even to cover any procedural lacuna in the statute. In State v. Navjot Sandhu, 2003 6 SCC 641 which is the celebrated Parliament Attack case, the Apex Court in paragraph 29 of the judgment reiterated the position that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised notwithstanding the power under Section 397 or any other provision of the Cr.P.C though not against the power under other laws. In Mahendra Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar, 2002 CrLJ 941 , even though it was observed by a two Judges' Bench of the Apex Court that filing too many applications under Section 482 Cr.P.C., after the rejection of the 1st one seeking enlargement of time for deposit of the fine amount was not permissible, the Supreme Court granted one month's time for making deposit of fine as directed by the High Court. Of course, in the decisions Mostt. Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee, 1990 CrLJ 1599, Sankatha Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1962 AIR(SC) 1208 and Moti Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1994 CrLJ 2184 a different note is struck to hold that in the face of an express bar either in the form of Section 362 or any other Section, the power under Section 482 cannot be invoked by the High Court so as to review its own judgment or order, those decisions were not in the context of seeking enlargement of time fixed under the final order passed by the High Court in revision.

(3.) After a careful evaluation of the aforesaid rulings of the Apex Court, I do not think that it is impermissible for the High Court to grant enlargement of time fixed under the final order passed in a revision by resorting to Section 482 Cr.P.C. in deserving cases. I am also convinced that by granting enlargement of time in these petitions filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., this Court will not be offending Section 362 Cr.P.C. In this view of the matter, I proceed to examine the petitions filed in each of the cases on their own merits.