A MAYILSWAMI Vs. STATE OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question that arises for consideration is whether the decision in Rajan Nair v. Mohan, (1993) 1 Ker LT 782 requires reconsideration. In the above decision a Division Bench of this Court held that the action initiated by directing issue of notice to the contemner should be within a period of one year from the date of the alleged contempt. The Division Bench held that if the court has not initiated proceedings by passing some order within a period of one year from the date of the alleged act of contempt the bar contained in S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 comes into operation. The court held that on a reading of S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act it is clear that it places absolute fetter on the power of the High Curt to initiate proceedings for contempt after the expira tion of the period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.

(2.) In the above decision N. Venkataramanappa v. D. K. Kaikar, AIR 1978 Karnataka 57 was relied. In that decision Karnataka High Court held that S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act operates as an absolute bar to initiation of contempt proceeding whether suo motu or at the instance of complainant after expiry of one year's limitation, starting point of limitation being the date on which contempt is alleged to have been committed and not date of knowledge of com plainant. That decision was overruled by the Full Bench of that Court in M/s. A. V. Kowdi and Co. v. R. V. Lakshmidevamma ILR (1990) Karnataka 4355. The Court held that the period of one year prescribed in S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act is applicable only in respect of contempt of subordinate courts and it has no application in cases of contempt of High Court and that the power conferred under Art. 215 of the Constitution of India is absolute and unfettered. In Pritam Pa1 v. High Court of M.P, AIR 1992 SC 904 : (1992 Cri LJ 1269) the Supreme Court held that the power of the Supreme Court and the High Court being the Courts of Record as em bodied under Art. 129 and 215 respectively cannot he restricted and trammeled by any ordinary legis lation including the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. The Supreme Court further observed that the inherent power of the Supreme Court and the High Court is elastic, unfettered and not subjected to any limit. As the power conferred upon the Supreme Court and the High Court being Courts of Record under Arts. 129 and 215 of the Constitution respec tively is an inherent power and as the jurisdiction vested in these courts is a special one not derived from any other statute but from the aforesaid Ar ticles of the Constitution of India, such power cannot be either abridged by any legislation or abrogated or cut down. The Supreme Court has expounded the position in explicit terms.

(3.) In Rajath v. M.S.P. Rajesh, 1980 Ker LT 802 a Division Bench of this Court held that provisions of S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act would apply to cases of civil contempt. The wording of the Section is wide enough to embrace all proceedings for contempt taken either suo motu or on a motion by parties, and the starting point of limitation under the Section can only be the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed by the person against whom the charge is levelled. This was a case where contempt proceedings were initiated for al leged disobedience of an order passed by the Sub Judge, Palakkad on Report No. 2 of 1978 submitted to that court by the receivers appointed in O.S. No. 237 of 1975. The Division Bench held that in view of the language used in S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act the starting point of limitation under the Section can only be the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed by the person against whom the charge is levelled.