FOOD INSPECTOR, PALGHAT MUNICIPALITY Vs. P. UNNIKRISHNAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Complainant, Food Inspector, Palghat Municipality is the appellant. He prosecuted the respondent for an offence punishable under section 16(1) (a; (1) for the contravention of section 7(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for having sold corn starch as if it is arrow root powder. The complaint filed by the appellant was tried as S.T. 110 of 1980 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palghat. Respondent was acquitted by giving him the benefit under section 19(2) of the Act.

(2.) Ext. P-18 report of the public analyst showed that the sample was wholly corn starch and therefore adulterated under section 2 (1A) (a) of the Act. On the application of the respondent one sample with the Local (Health) Authority was sent for analysis to the Central Food Laboratory and Ext. C(I) certificate is the effect that the sample does not conform to the standards laid down for arrow root powder under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and rules thereof in that it is misbranded under section 2(ix) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act as having no arrow root powder, but identified as Maize (Corn) and tapioca powder. The result of examination in Ext, Cl Are:

(3.) The contention of the responder.t was that arrow root powder in sealed containers with label and licence number were purchased from the representatives of "Taju Productions, Cannanore" under Ext. D-l bill which contained warranty also and hence he is exonerated under section 19(2). "Taju Productions" is said to be the manufacturer. Cri. A. 128 of 1982 which I have decided on 22.7.1985 was on identical facts in all respects with the only difference that the respondent was a different person. Same Advocates appeared on either side in that case also. In that case, I have discussed the facts, evidence and law in elaborate details and found that the respondent was not entitled to the benefits under section 19(2). He was accordingly convicted and sentenced, allowing the appeal. Therefore, the contention under section 19 (2) was practically not argued before me. Yet I am considering that aspect on the merits briefly because I am of the opinion that the Magistrate went wrong in his finding.