WEST COAST FIBRE INDUSTRIES Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The three petitioners are conducting coconut husk decortication industries which were licensed earlier than the promulgation of the Kerala Coconut Husks Control Order. All three are members of the Decorticated Fibre Producers Association, Unnikkulam Amson, Kozhikode. Their complaint is against the attempts of the State and its subordinate officers in mobilising procurement of green husks for retting for use in the traditional coir industry, which is organised mainly on co-operative basis, and the allotment of only dry coconut husks to the mechanised sector of the industry. This is sought to be done by issue of permits enabling the mechanised industrial sector to purchase only dry (brcwn) coconut husks. Petitioners submit that their industries were started at a time when there was no restriction at all in the procurement of husks, and therefore the machineries in the industrial units were so devised and fabricated as to consume green husks for manufacture of fibre. The restriction imposed in the procurement of green husks by the mechanised units operates as an unreasonable fetter on their freedom of trade, according to the petitioners. Preference to the Co-operative Sector, which, according to them, is not justified on the facts, amounts to hostile discrimination against the mechanised sector, and therefore, violates Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is also their case, that if the respondents were earnest and serious, far more of green husks than is required by the Co-operative sector for manufacture of coir in traditional methods mainly by manual process, could have been procured, without in any manner restricting the intake of such husks by the mechanised sector. Restriction on the right of freedom of trade is, therefore, said to be unreasonable and violative of Art. 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution. They further contend that the Kerala Husks Control Order is unconstitutional, since husk does not fall under cl. (a) of Entry III since it is not a product of an industry, the control of which is vested in the Union Government as declared by Parliament. In the alternative, it is submitted that the power under the Kerala Essential Articles Control (Temporary) Powers Act cannot be availed of by the State since such power is limited to such articles that are not essential commodities under the Essential Commodities Act. Petitioners therefore seek invalidation of the Kerala Coconut Husks Control Order and the restrictions imposed in the permits issued in their favour, that they shall procure only dry (brown) husks.

(2.) Respondents 1 to 3 submit that it is a matter of policy for the State to decide whether mechanised industry engaged in manufacture of coir fibre shall be permitted to procure green husks or dry husks. It is again a matter of policy as to whether the State shall reserve any industry or portion thereof for operation by the traditional and manual sector or the Co-operative sector or mechanised private industries sector. In such matters of policy involving expediency, the jurisdiction of the court is ordinarily not attracted, except of course, in cases where arbitrariness in dealing with rights of citizens is alleged and satisfactorily proved. It is again a matter of policy for the State to decide as to whether a commodity which is essential for the conduct of a particular industry shall be best utilised in the larger interests of the largest number of people or should be permitted to be cornered by the affluent industries. In such matters also, according to the respondents, the court cannot ordinarily exercise its powers of judicial review, since peference of a larger number of persons engaged in traditional and manual processes of manufacture of coir, against a few industrialists, cannot, in any case, be considered as arbitrary or discriminatory.

(3.) The controversy which has to be resolved is, therefore, basically one of policy. The scope of judicial review in such regions is severely limited. It is not open for this court ordinarily to reframe the policy on its own or annul a policy adopted by the State on considerations of expediency or for the only reason that an alternative policy would have been possible, or for the reason that it may be equally expedient to adopt an alternative course. Unless it be that there is manifest arbitrariness in the exclusion of some out of the many from the benefits which they would have normally been entitled to enjoy, this court is not ordinarily entitled to interfere. The merits of mechanisation in an over-populated country where the number of unemployed increases year after year is a matter better left to be decided by the executive administrative instrumentalities of the State, subject of course to an effective oversight to ensure that such policy does not transgress the limits of reasonableness and amount to arbitrariness in State action. The only course open to the courts in matters of executive policy depending on expediency is to confine themselves to this eagle-eyed oversight. The courts do not ordinarily travel beyond that and shall not be directly involved in matters of executive policy or administrative expediency. I have, therefore, to approach the problem thrown up in these original petitions with this caution as the governing factor.