(1.) THE suit has been instituted by the plaintiff claiming to be an indigent person. THE 4th defendant is the appellant. THE dispute relates to the ownership and possession of the bus KRE. 43. THE appellant challenges the order of the Subordinate Judge of Parur in I. A. No. 827 of 1984 allowing the plaintiff's application to appoint her as the receiver of the bus.
(2.) IT is the common case that the registered owner of the bus is one M. V. Jacob who purchased it on hire purchase for Rs. 1,40,000/ -. He is still the registered owner, although he transferred the bus on 2-2-1981 to the 3rd defendant (Omana Kuttan) for a sum of Rs. 94,5001- (see Ext. A5 ). (The parties seem to have acted on the assumption that the transfer is virtually a sale, and have viewed the subsequent transactions also as contracts of sale. IT is in that sense that we shall refer to these transactions ). The 3rd defendant sold the bus to the plaintiff as per Ext. A4 dated 13-10-1981 for a sum of Rs. 1,20,000/ -. The registration certificate (still in the name of M. V. Jacob) and other papers were also handed over to the plaintiff. The dispute relates to the subsequent facts.
(3.) ON 12-3-1982 the bus was seized on the motion of the plaintiff by the Circle Inspector of Police, Perumbavoor from the possession of the 2nd defendant while it was parked at the bus stand. Thereupon the 2nd defendant moved the learned Magistrate on 13-3-1982 for interim custody of the bus: By Ext. A10 dated 16-3-1982 his request was granted. The 2nd defendant then filed Crl. M. C No. 335 of 1982 before this Court. Allowing that petition, chandrasekhara Menon, J. pointed out: "what appears from the complaint is that the. first accused (1st defendant) was authorised to sell the vehicle and be sold the vehicle to the second accused (2nd defendant) for a lesser consideration. " He observed that the dispute involved in the plaintiff's private complaint concerned the ownership of the bus which was a matter that could more appropriately be decided by a civil court and for that purpose recourse to a criminal court was an abuse of the process of the court. So stating the learned judge quashed the proceedings in C. C. No. 160 of 1982 as far as the 2nd defendant was concerned (see Ext. B3 judgment dated 14-9-1982 ). Notwithstanding that observation, the plaintiff did not think it necessary to institute proceedings in the civil court. .