(1.) The object of revisional jurisdiction is to afford a paternal or supervisory power to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, lack of proper precautions, etc., which has resulted in some injury or undeserved hardship. To appeal is a statutory right. But that is not the case with revisional jurisdiction. In revisional jurisdiction, it is for the Court to interfere in exceptional cases where it seems that some real substantial injustice has been done. Violation of fundamental rules in the matter of appreciation of evidence resulting in miscarriage of justice is one of the instances where the High Court is justified in interfering for the purpose of revising the decision of a subordinate court in order to correct the injustice that has happened. If a particular fact is decided totally in the absence of evidence or misconstruing the evidence on record totally, the High Court may be justified in interfering. At the same time the mere possibility of another view on a particular point is no reason for interference.
(2.) The presumption of law is that a person is innocent unless and until otherwise found and convicted by a Court of law. That presumption is available even to an accused who is charge-sheeted for rashness and negligence in driving a motor vehicle which resulted in injury or loss of life to pedestrians or others. Simply because an incident happened which resulted in injury or death to somebody, it cannot be taken for granted that the driver of the vehicle involved in the incident is guilty of the crime. There may be exceptional cases where the rule res ipsa loquitur applies. In such cases the proved facts and circumstances may speak for themselves, and the Court may be justified in coming to the available conclusions in the absence of evidence otherwise. Ordinarily it is for the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In a case of rash and negligent driving, the duty of the prosecution does not end by proving the rashness or negligence on the part of the driver. It must also be proved that the rashness and negligence was responsible for the incident and the consequent injury or death. The mere suspicion from the circumstances that the incident happened in a particular way may not be sufficient. There must be direct nexus between the death or injury and the rash or negligent act. There is no prescription that drivers of motor vehicles drive them rashly and negligently. If a pedestrian suddenly crosses the road without taking note of the approaching vehicle, there is every possibility of his dashing against the vehicle without the driver becoming aware of it. The driver may not be able to avert the accident whatever care he takes. Other similar instances can also arise. There is no presumption of negligence from the mere fact that a man is knocked down and killed by a motorist.
(3.) The revision petitioner was charge-sheeted in C.C.629 of 1977 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ponnani for having committed offences punishable under Ss. 279 and 304-A, Penal Code. The charge against him was that on 12-9-1977 at about 1.30 p.m he drove a lorry KRE 1818 rashly and negligently from north to south through Kuttippuram-Edappal Road resulting in the lorry hitting against the boy. On the way to the hospital, the boy died. On the side of the prosecution, 8 witnesses were examined and Exts. P1 to P6 were marked. The learned Magistrate found the revision petitioner guilty. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months for the offence under S. 304-A and to pay a fine of Rs. 300/- with a default sentence of rigorous imprisonment for two months. In Crl. A.76 of 1979, the Sessions Judge, Maneri confirmed the conviction and sentence and dismissed the appeal. Hence he came up in revision.